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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following are the issues presented for review, including the applicable
standard of review for each as well as the citation to the record where the issue was
preserved below:
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court correctly rule that the Brighton Title failed to
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where Brighton Title
did not seek to controvert Cooper's statement of undisputed facts? A trial court's
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed
de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was
preserved. (R. 712-729).
Issue No. 2: Did the Court rule correctly Cooper was entitled to judgment against
Brighton Title as a matter of law? A trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil
procedure present a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 469-577).
Issue No. 3: Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its discretion by
failing to provide any analysis or reasoning in granting Cooper summary judgment? This
issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL,
2004 UT 102, U 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Whether a trial court abused its discretion is
reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, \ 7,
141 P.3d 629. This issue was preserved. (R. 727).
8

Issue No. 4: Did the trial court err as a matter of law ixji concluding Brighton Title
was bound by the terms of a real estate purchase contract to which it was not a party?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 483-85).
Issue No. 5: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding Brighton Title
owed any fiduciary duty to Cooper? This issue presents a question of law which is
reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, J| 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This
issue was preserved. (R. 482-83).
Issue No. 6: Did the trial court err in concluding the lltah Department of
Insurance Bulletin did not have the force of law and cannot be used to excuse Brighton
Title's conduct? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo.
Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1241 This issue was preserved.
(R. 480-82).
Issue No. 7: Did the trial court err as a matter of law ih signing the ruling
prepared by counsel for Cooper where the minute entry instructed counsel to only prepare
an order? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v.
Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This is^ue was preserved. (R. 74245).
Issue No. 8: Did the trial court correctly rule Brightori Title did not have standing
to challenge an award of attorney fees where that award was jnot entered against
Appellant? This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v.
Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This iskie was preserved. (R.

769).
Issue No., 9: Did the trial court correctly conclude Brighton Title breached its
contractual obligations to Cooper where Cooper first breached the contract by
representing it was the fee title owner of the property when it was not? This issue
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004
UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 478-80).
Issue No. 10: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding the seller of
real property did not have to be on title at all during the executory period of a contract?
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
VilL, 2004 UT 102, \ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved (R. 478-80).
Issue No. 11: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding Brighton
Title breached its duties to Cooper where the transaction was an illegal flip? This issue
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004
UT 102,1| 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This issue was preserved. (R. 480-81).
Issue No. 12: Did the trial court err as a matter of law in ruling a title company
may act as an escrow agent where they are unable to insure the transaction because one of
the parties' is not on title to the property? This issue presents a question of law which is
reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, U 17, 104 P.3d 1242. This
issue was preserved. (R. 483).
Issue No. 13: Did the trial court err when it concluded there were no genuine
issues of material fact which precluded the grant of summary judgment? This issue
presents a question of fact which is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to
10

the district court. Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, ^ f, 156 P.3d 175. This
issue is preserved. (R. 744).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCE, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions which govern thijs action. However, the
applicable law includes Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated, Utah Department of
Insurance Bulletins 2007-1 and 2007-5, all of which are attached in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves a split closing flip transaction wherein the Appellee
("Cooper") intended to use the funds from defendant, Deseret Sky ("Deseret Sky") to
complete their purchase of the property from the original owner of the real property.
Cooper retained the services of Metro National Title to handld its portion of the split
closing. Deseret Sky retained the services of Appellant ("Brighton Title") to handle its
side of the split closing. Deseret Sky executed a real estate piirchase contract ("REPC")
agreeing to purchase the property from Cooper. At the time trie REPC was executed,
Cooper had only a contractual right to purchase the property, and was not in title.
However, at the time the REPC was executed by Cooper, it represented it had fee title to
the property.
The REPC required an earnest money deposit of $100j000 which became nonrefundable at the conclusion of the due diligence period. Brighton Title received the
initial earnest money deposit from Deseret Sky. By May 31, 2007, Brighton Title
became aware Cooper did not hold fee title to the property. Upon this discovery
11

Brighton Title had discussions with its underwriter, Stewart Title, who infonned Brighton
Title it would not insure the transaction. Further, Stewart Title informed Brighton Title
that based on the nature of the closing, it should return the earnest money to Deseret Sky
and refuse to participate in the transaction as structured, regardless of what the REPC
stated. On June 1, 2007, Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper was not on
title.
On the date Deseret Sky's real estate agent Angela Gowan received the Due
Diligence from Cooper, she spoke with Deseret Sky who wanted Cooper to provide some
kind of assurance that the original seller was aware of the transaction between Cooper
and Deseret Sky. Brighton Title contacted Metro National Title and informed it that
Brighton Title would not insure the transaction unless Cooper provided a full assignment
of its interest in the Hansen Contract to Deseret Sky or alternatively Cooper provided
assurances that it would close the Hansen Contract with its own independent funds to
insure that it was not a flip transaction.
Cooper at all times intended to use a portion of the sale proceeds from the sale of
the property to Deseret Sky to complete its purchase of the property from Hansen. A
principal in Brighton Title, Jeff Gorringe, testified when the Utah Insurance Department
issued Bulletin 2007-1, he contacted a market conduct investigator with the Insurance
Department for clarification of the Bulletin. Gorringe was informed if a title/escrow
agency performed such a transaction and was caught, the Insurance Department would
take action against their license.
In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies become non-refundable on June
12

8, 2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Ski. The parties
contemplated a "split closing" wherein Brighton Title was to handle the closing for the
buyer, Deseret Sky, issuing a lender's insurance policy, and Metro National Title was to
handle the seller's closing for Cooper, issuing an owner's insurance policy. However, the
REPC did not contain a split closing addendum. Deseret Sky iieither canceled the REPC
by providing written notice to Cooper nor delivered a written objection to Cooper
regarding Deseret Sky's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence Deadline.
After the expiration of the Due Diligence period, on June 11, 2007, Deseret Sky sent a
letter (back dated to June 8, 2007) to Robert Cooper terminating the REPC and
instructing Brighton Title to "return all earnest money deposits to the Buyer."
On June 12 of 2007, after having previously informed Metro National Title that
Deseret Sky would not close absent either an assignment of the Hansen contract or other
assurances, Brighton Title informed Cooper that Brighton Tit e was going to release the
earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky. The money was thereafter returned to
Deseret Sky. The sole reason Brighton returned the earnest nkmey to Deseret Sky was
because its underwriter, Stewart Title believed the transaction was a flip and it would not
insure the transaction, based on the express language of the l|tah Department of
Insurance Bulletin 2007-1. As a result of Deseret Sky's refusal to complete the
transaction because Cooper was not on title and it could not be insured, no sale was
transacted and Cooper was unable to purchase the Property ujider the Hansen Contract.
At no time has Cooper ever been on title to the subject property.
Cooper sued Deseret Sky and Brighton Title, seeking iquidated damages in the
13

total amount of $200,000.00, of which $100,000.00 represented the initial earnest money
deposited with Brighton Title. Following discovery, the parties moved for summary
judgment against one another. Without a hearing, the Court granted summary judgment
in favor of Cooper. Brighton Title appeals from that judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A. Procedural Facts
1. Cooper commenced this action on the September 14, 2007. (R. 1-23).
2. Brighton Title answered the complaint on October 9, 2007. (R. 32-42).
3. The parties conducted discovery.
4. On October 20, 2008, Cooper filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 195468).
5. On November 6, 2008, Brighton Title filed its counter motion for summary
judgment, together with a memorandum in opposition to the Cooper's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Support of Brighton Title's Motion for Summary
Judgment. (R.469-577).
6. On November 17, 2008, Cooper filed its memorandum in opposition to Brighton
Title's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 685-696).
7. On November 24, 2008, Brighton Title filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 697-703).
8. On January 7, 2009, the Court entered the following minute entry, which stated
verbatim:
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment and Defendant Brighton Title
14

Company's counter-motion for summary judgment. Based upon a
review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the Court rules as follows:
1. The request for hearing is denied. Th£ Court has reviewed the
pleadings filed in this matter, and orall argument, would not be of
assistance in ruling.
|
2. The Plaintiffs motion for summary jiidgment is granted.
Defendant Deseret Sky has not responded to Plaintiffs motion.
Defendant Brighton Title Company's responsive memorandum
failed to comply with the requirement^ of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes
that the Plaintiffs statement of undisputed facts is
incontroverted, and that there is no g$nuinue issue of material
fact in dispute. Additionally, based uJ3on the memoranda filed,
the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment against both defendants,
jointly and severally; as to Deseret Sky Development, for the entire
amount of liquidated damages and as to Brighton Title Company, for
the $ 100,000 returned to Deseret Sky.
Counsel for Plaintiff is requested p prepare an order
consistent with this ruling. (R. 707-708)1
9.

On January 13, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Motion ror Clarification and

Reconsideration of Court's Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment. (R. 710-729).
10.

On January 22, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection to Cooper's draft

Judgment. (R. 739-741).
11.

On January 2, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection |to Cooper's Draft of Ruling

on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Co's
Countermotion for Summary Judgment. (R. 742-745).
12.

On January 26, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Objection to Affidavit of Attorney

Fees and Costs. (R. 746-750).
13.

On February 20, 2009, the Court entered its Minute Entry-Court's Clarification of

Prior Ruling on Summary Judgment. (R. 783-788).
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14.

On March 3, 2009, Brighton Title filed its Notice of Appeal. (R. 792-793).

15.

On March 16, 2009, the Court signed the Cooper's Proposed Ruling and

Judgment. (R. 802-831).
B.

Factual History

16.

Cooper Enterprises, P.C. ("Cooper") is a Utah professional corporation. (R 1, 32,

230).
17.

Deseret Sky Development, LLC ("Deseret Sky"), is a Utah limited liability

company. (R. 1,32,43 230).
18.

Brighton Title Company, LLC ("Brighton Title") is a Utah limited liability

company. (R. 2, 32, 44, 230).
19.

The real property which is the subject hereof is located in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah, and known generally as Danish Heights Estates PUD or 2745 East Creek Road,
Cottonwood Heights, Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 2, 33, 44, 230).
20.

By Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land, with offer reference date of May 25,

2007, as modified by Addenda Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (the "REPC"), Cooper agreed to sell and
Deseret Sky agreed to by the Property. (R. 2, 44, 198, 231).
21.

At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper was not on title to the property but

had the property under contract to purchase from WH Hansen, LLC. (R. 44, 231, 488501).
22.

At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper represented in the REPC that it

had fee title to the property. (R. 473, 534).
23.

Angela Gowan acted as real estate agent for Deseret Sky with respect to the
16

transaction with Cooper. (R. 231,473).
24.

On or about May 31, 2007, Brighton Title became awaile Cooper was not in title to

the Property. (R. 232,473).
25.

On June 1, 2007 Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky that Cooper was not in title.

(R. 473, 512).
26.

Brighton Title discussed the transaction with Stewart Title, its underwriter, who

informed Brighton Title it would not insure the transaction anil based on the nature of the
closing, it should return the earnest money to Deseret Sky and refuse to participate in the
transaction as structured. (R. 518, 566, 571-573).
27.

On or about June 1, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper a copy of the

Hansen Contract. (R. 232,473,488-501).
28.

On the date Ms. Gowans received the Due Diligence fiiom Cooper, she spoke with

Deseret Sky who wanted Cooper to provide some kind of assurance Hansen was aware of
the transaction between Cooper and Deseret Sky. (R. 473, 506-07).
29.

Brighton Title contacted Metro National Title and informed it Brighton Title

would not insure the transaction unless Cooper provided a full assignment of its interest
in the Hansen Contract to Deseret Sky or alternatively Coopei: provided assurances it
would close the Hansen Contract with its own independent ftjnds to insure that it was not
an illegal flip transaction. (R. 473-74, 521).
30.

Cooper at all times intended to use a portion of the salb proceeds from the sale of

the property to Deseret Sky to complete its purchase of the property from Hansen. (R.
551-52).

17

31.

Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title testified when the Utah Insurance Department

issued Bulletin 2007-1, he contacted Jeri Jones, a market conduct investigator with the
Insurance Department for clarification of the Bulletin and was informed if a title/escrow
agency performed such a transaction and was caught, the Insurance Department would
take action against their license. (R. 474,526-28, 542-45).
32.

Ms. Gowans did not talk to Brighton Title about the Hansen Contract until after

the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky had been voided. (R. 474).
33.

The REPC, paragraph 2(a) reflected an initial earnest money deposit of One

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) and provided: 'THIS DEPOSIT MAY
BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE". (R. 232,474,531-41).
34.

Paragraph 2 of the Addendum No. 1 to REPC provides:
2)
Earnest Money to be deposited with Brighton Title Company upon
acceptance. An additional $100,000 earnest money to be deposited with
Brighton Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence deadline. Total of
$200,000 shall [be] non-refundable after June 8, 2007.

(R. 232,474-75, 531-41).
35.

Addendum No. 2 Of the REPC provides:
1. REPC, Section 2(d) $100,000 additional earnest money due on June 8,
2007 by 5:00 p.m. M D T . . .
6. [sic] $100,000 Earnest Money to be non-refundable but applicable and
immediately released to seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MDT.
6. An addition $100,000 Earnest Money will be deposited on June 8, 2007 by
5:00 p.m. MDT which is non-refundable but applicable and immediately
released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MDT.

(R. 232-33, 475, 531-41).
36.

Addenuin No. 3 provides:
4) All earnest monies shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and shall
18

be released to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 jat 5:00 p.m. MST .
(R. 233,475, 531-41).
37.

Brighton Title accepted the initial $100,000 earnest molney from Deseret Sky in

escrow, in its capacity as Deseret Sky's escrow agent. (R. 233, 475, 513-14, 516).
38.

The parties contemplated a "split closing" wherein Brighton Title was to handle

the closing for the buyer, Deseret Sky, issuing a lender's insurance policy, and Metro
National Title was to handle the seller's closing for Cooper, issuing an owner's insurance
policy. (R. 475,515,531-541).
39.

The REPC did not contain a split closing addendum. (% 475, 531-41, 546-48).

40.

The REPC provides in paragraph 16:
16. DEFAULT: If Buyer defaults, Seller may $lect to . . . retain the
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, j . .

(R. 234-35,476,531-41).
41.

Deseret Sky did not directly cancel nor object to the REPC by June 8, 2007, other

than through Brighton Title who communicated to Metro National Title prior to the June
8, 2007 that absent an assignment of the Hansen Contract or q>ther assurances, Deseret
Sky would not close the transaction. (R. 235, 476).
42.

The June 8, 2007 deadline for Deseret Sky to deposit an additional $100,000 with

Brighton Title came and went without any additional funds being deposited, but also
without any assignment or assurances from Cooper. (R. 235 476, 516).
43.

On June 8, 2007, Deseret Sky telephoned Jeff Gorringe at Brighton Title and

informed them not to distribute the earnest money funds. (R. 476,519).
44.

Deseret Sky sent a letter instructing Brighton Title to ' return all earnest money
19

deposits to Buyer." (R. 235,476).
45.

On June 12, 2007, Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Cooper that Brighton

Title was going to release the earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky. (R. 235-36,
476, 522-23).
46.

The sole reason Brighton Title returned the earnest money to Deseret Sky was

because its underwriter, Stewart Title believed the transaction was a flip and it would not
insure the transaction. (R. 476, 529).
47.

None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro National Title. (R. 236,

477,517,523-25).
48.

Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title testified if he turned the earnest money over to

Metro National Title, because Cooper was not on title to the property, he could not
provide any protection to Deseret Sky regarding any claim Deseret Sky may have had to
the property. (R. 477,530).
49.

Because Cooper relied on funds from the sale of the Property to Deseret Sky to

fund Cooper's purchase, Cooper was unable to purchase the Property under the Hansen
Contract. (R. 237,477).
50.

To date, Cooper has never acquired title to the Property. (R. 477, 507-508).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
This case in large measure speaks to the general issue of the conflicting duties

imposed by statutes, rules of conduct governing a particular industry, and regulatory
agency interpretations. In the specific context of this case, it competes the general duties
owed by a title agency with statutory prohibitions and insurance department policies
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which may directly result in licensing sanctions. However, on a broader view, the same
problems can arise in other contexts, including but not limited to the practice of law.
As argued herein, there are a number of reasons this Co^rt should reverse the trial
court's decision. There are issues of fact which precluded both parties from being
granted summary judgment. Cooper was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This Court should clarify the obligations of a responding party under Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure where the responding party [does not controvert the
facts as stated but rather enlarges upon those facts adding its olwn additional facts.
i

This Court should clarify the duties of a trial court jud^e when ruling upon a
motion for summary judgment. Must the Court provide analysis and reasoning for its
decision, or may it simply state, "Motion granted" leaving to the whim of the successful
party to devine the Court's reasoning? In addition, where the |Minute Entry constitutes
the Ruling of the Court, the Court abuses its discretion when it signs a parties' drafted
Ruling where the party was never instructed to prepare one.
Narrowing the focus to this particular case, a title company should not be bound to
the terms of a contract to which it is not a party nor to which it has consented. The
parties cannot impose a duty upon a party who never consents thereto.
Where the parties contemplate the employment of separate title companies acting
as insurers and escrow agents, with each employing their owij, the title company owes a
fiduciary duty only to the party by whom it was engaged. Thfe general duty of a joint
fiduciary duty simply should not apply.
Regardless of whether the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin as the actual
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force of law, it has the practical force of law because of the sanctions which may be
imposed for it violation. As such, a title company acting as insurer and escrow agent
must comply with the Bulletin or face sanctions. Liability cannot be rested upon a good
faith compliance with the Insurance Department's mandates.
When the Court awarded attorney fees albeit not against Brighton Title, Brighton
Title objected. The Court ruled it did not have standing. Brighton Title believes that for
any issue before the Court, a defendant party has standing to object. This Court should
clarify when a defendant in an action has no standing to challenge any part of the
proceedings because the claims do not go directly against that party.
Cooper was not in title to the property and to this date has never been in title to the
property. However, it expressly represented in the REPC it was the fee title holder of the
property. Brighton Title believes it cannot be held liable for its alleged breach of contract
where Cooper breached first by affirmatively misrepresenting its state of ownership in the
property. While a seller does not have to hold title during the entire executory period,
liability for breach by a buyer cannot be rested upon an impossibility to acquire that title
absent the purchase money from the subsequent purchaser. Further, because the
transaction was an illegal flip in violation of the good funds statute, Brighton Title was
precluded as a matter of law from participating in the transaction.
Finally, a title company, acting as escrow agent and insurer is precluded by law
from participating in transactions it cannot insure. Because Cooper was not on title and
Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, its participation was illegal. Brighton
Title had no choice but to return the funds to Deseret Sky.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
THERE WERE BOTH GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND COOPER
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The trial court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment to
Cooper because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not
entitled to judgment as matter of law. A trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil
procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Further, the grant of summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the district court. Bluffdale City v.
Smith, 2007 UT App 25, j[ 5, 156 P.3d 175. Further, when faced with a motion for
summary judgment, the Court must view all facts including all reasonable inferences in
favor of the non-moving party. Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146,
Tf 7, 184 P.3d 610. Because there were genuine issues of material fact, and because
Cooper is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, this Coi^rt must reverse the trial
court.
In the instant action, Brighton Title did not dispute the facts alleged by Cooper.
It did however present additional facts which should have created a genuine issue of
material fact which should have precluded the grant of summary judgment. Brighton
Title submitted the Hansen Contract which revealed that Cooper was not on title to the
property. (R. 488-501), creating a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether
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Cooper had any interest in the property and moreover an interest which gave rise to the
right to sell the property to Deseret Sky.
Brighton Title submitted the affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, former Assistant
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department who explained the nature of Insurance
Department Bulletins and the sanctions or enforcement which can spring from the
violations of said bulletins. (R. 560-563). Mr. Stevens averred it was industry standard
and practice to comply with the bulletins. As such, the bulletins were treated as having
the force of law in industry practice.
In addition, Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Jeff Gorringe who stated
on June 1, 2008, he informed Metro National Title that Deseret Sky would not close on
the transaction because Cooper was not in title. (R. 566-569). This constituted an
objection before the June 8, 2008. Gorringe informed Metro National Title unless
Cooper provided a full assignment of the Hansen contract or provided assurances Cooper
would close the transaction with its own funds, Brighton Title would not participate in
this illegal flip transaction. (R. 566-567). Cooper provided no evidence that it forwarded
to Brighton Title either an assignment of the Hansen contract or it provided assurances it
could close the transaction with its own funds.
Brighton Title presented the affidavit of Matt Sager the underwriting counsel for
Stewart Guaranty Company (R. 570-574). He stated he specifically reviewed the
transaction and found it to be an illegal flip transaction. (R. 572).
Cooper asserted a contractual claim in the Property which it believed provided the
legal basis to sell the Property. (R. 532-541). It did not provide any evidence to the
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Court of a present ability to obtain title prior to the closing of the Deseret Sky sale. Thus,
there was a question of fact concerning whether Cooper had ahy practical ability to obtain
title during the executory period without violating Utah law. "jThis alone precluded the
grant of summary judgment.
While Brighton did not dispute the factual allegations presented by Cooper, it did
present additional facts which created a genuine issue of material fact which precluded
the grant of summary judgment. Based on these factual disputes, this Court must reverse
the trial court. In addition, as discussed more fully below, evto in the absence of genuine
issues of material fact, Cooper was not entitled to judgment a$ a matter of law.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT BOUND TO FOLLOW THE INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT'S BULLETINS
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that Brighton Title was not bound
to follow the Utah Department of Insurance Bulletins. This i^sue presents a question of
law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, f 17, 104 P.3d
1242. While this issue focuses on the specific facts and bulletins at issue in the present
action, the results have far reaching ramifications, including for those engaged in the
practice of law. Brighton Title believes the trial court erred ajs a matter of law in
concluding both that Brighton Title was not obligated to comply with the Bulletins and its
compliance therewith did not excuse its performance under the terms of the REPC.
Utah has adopted the good funds statute, as set forth irk Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended). Essentially, this statutejrequires in part that funds
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be cleared before they can disbursed. On or about January 30, 2007, D. Kent Michie,
Utah Insurance Commissioner, issued Bulletin 2007-1, thereby interpreting the above
referenced statute as it relates to prohibited escrow settlement closings. (R. 543).
Bulletin 2007-1 states:
Due to the large number of "land flip" transaction and use by real estate agents of
the Simultaneous Closing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract (a copy of
which is attached), and due to the fact that "flipping" real estate often involves
fraud, the Utah Insurance Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission
have determined the following structure to be the only permitted method of acting
as escrowr wherein the same parcel of property is purchased and then immediately
sold.
The transactions effected by this bulletin are those transactions in which Seller
"A" contract with Buyer "B" to sell a parcel of property. Buyer "B" then contracts
with Buyer U C" to sell the same parcel of property. Buyer "B" anticipates
acquiring the parcel and selling the parcel at or near the same time.
The transaction between Seller "A" and Buyer "B" must close independently from
the transaction between Buyer "B" and Buyer "C". The funds deposited by Buyer
"C" may not be used to fund the closing between Seller "A" and Buyer "B".
Buyer U B" must provide funds independent of funds generated by Buyer "C".
A policy of title insurance must be issued in the Seller "A" to Buyer "B"
transaction and in Buyer "B" to Buyer "C" transaction. Each real estate
transaction must stand on its own. Buyer "B" must close with Buyer "B's" own
good fund and record so that Buyer "B" is in title prior to the second transaction
closing and recording.
The above structure insures compliance with 31 A-23a-406 and R590-153-5.
(R. 543, emphasis supplied). 1 As if the verbal explanation were not sufficient, the
Bulletin includes a graphic depiction of flips which are and are not permitted. (R. 545).
The instant transaction expressly and squarely fits within the description of flip
transactions which are not permitted. In the instant case, Cooper entered into a contract
l R590-153-5 has been repealed and renumbered R592-6-1 etseq. References throughout
this brief will continue to refer to the old citation.
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to purchase the Property from Hansen. (R. 488-502). Thereafter, without closing on
title, Cooper entered into a Real Estate Purchase Contract to sill the property to Deseret
Sky. (R. 2, 198, 231, 280-289). However, Cooper at all times intended to use part of the
sale proceeds received from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the property from
Hansen. (R. 551-52). As such, the transaction was expressly; a flip which the
Department of Insurance stated was prohibited by Section 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended) as interpreted by the Department in Bulletin 2007-1.
Before the trial court, Cooper made the disingenuous; argument that the Bulletin
is essentially advisory, lacking any force of law. This argument is simply without merit.
First, courts regularly defer to agency interpretation of the statutes they are charged with
administering. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91
S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (stating agency interpretation "entitled to
a presumption of regularity"). Admittedly, while the Court need not give deference to the
interpretative Bulletin, those in the industry must do so or facp the peril of their conduct.
Nelson v. Betit, 937 P.2d 1238, 1306 (Utah App. 1997).
With the foregoing being said, the title and escrow indiistry licensees who are
subject to enforcement actions by the Department, as well as ihe Department itself, treat
the Bulletin as though it had the force of law. As set forth in jhe affidavit of Richard
Peter Stevens, former Assistant Commissioner for the Department of Insurance, a
violation of the statute as interpreted in the Bulletin can result in enforcement and
sanctions. (R. 561-563). In addition, it is the practice in the industry to comply with the
interpretations set forth in all such Bulletins. (R. 564-569, 5J71-573). In short, the
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industry treats the Utah Insurance Department Bulletins as having the force of law.
The circumstance is akin to many other situations where rules of professional
conduct govern a particular industry. By way of example, the Rules of Professional
Conduct govern the practice of law. These rules are explained and applied in ethics
advisory opinions. In In re: McCully, 942 P.2d 327, 334 (Utah 1997), the Court instructs a
judge to consult ethics advisory opinions when considering what he should or should not do with
respect to giving opinion testimony in a proceeding in another court. Utah is not alone in
referring to ethics advisory opinions as providing a basis for determining what is or is not
permissible conduct. See e.g. Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual, 788 So. 2d 1140, 1145
(La. 5/15/01); Petition of Wiley, 671 A.2d 308, 310 (R.I. 1996); and State v. Jones, 726
S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1987)(where the Court held that ethics advisory opinions while
persuasive do not have the force of law and are not binding on the Court). Regardless of
whether they have the force of law, by the industry they are treated as having such. A
practitioner is on notice that if an ethics advisory opinion proscribes particular conduct, a
violation of that opinion will result in censure.
In the instant case, Brighton Title was faced with an express Department of
Insurance Bulletin which said the proposed transaction violated Utah law. Brighton Title
recognized the transaction as a violation of Utah's good funds statute and the
interpretative Bulletin 2007-1. As such, it could do nothing but withdraw from the
transaction and refund the money to its depositor, Deseret Sky Development.
Compliance with a Utah Department of Insurance Bulletin (or an ethics advisory
opinion) should not provide a basis for a monetary judgment. As stated by the Court in
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Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d 125 (Ala. 1983) in discussing the effect of an advisory
opinion, "Such an opinion has the effect of protecting such person to whom it is directed
from liability . . . because of any official action or actions performed as directed or
advised in such opinion." Id. at 128. In the instant circumstance, Brighton Title was
prudent and followed the admonition of the agency charged with providing
interpretations of the law to members of the industry. By so doing, it should be protected
from liability for that compliance. The trial court erred by finding otherwise.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING IN iTHE CONTEXT OF A
SPLIT CLOSING A TITLE COMPANY OWES A FIDUCIARY DUTY TO BOTH
PARTIES TO THE TRANSACTION ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
TRANSACTION IS ILLEGAL
In rendering its summary judgment ruling, the trial court concluded that Brighton
Title breached its fiduciary duty owed to Cooper. While generally, a title company acting
as escrow agent owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction, in the case of a
split closing involving a separately retained title agent, the general rule should not apply.
In the instant action, Cooper elected the transaction clqse as a "split closing"
which means that the buyer engages its own title company anji the seller engages a
different title company. The trial court held in this context, e^ch title company owes a
fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction. This issue presents a question of law
which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004;UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d
1242. Brighton title believes the Court erred as a matter of la|w because it owed no
contractually based fiduciary duty to Cooper.

29

Generally, the rule is an escrow agent owes a duty to both parties to the
transaction. Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987); Hertz v.
Nordic Ltd, Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1988). The obvious underlying
assumption of the concept of fiduciary duties to all parties to the transaction involves a
foundation that the parties include a Seller in title and a Buyer hoping to take title. It
should not necessarily include a rogue who is not in title and structures a transaction to
turn a quick profit in a prohibited transaction, using separate title agents to manipulate its
shell game.
However, the rule may well not apply in the circumstances of a split closing. In
such cases, the seller retains the services of one title/escrow agency and the buyer
employs another.

Again, the Department of Insurance has provided a Bulletin which

details the nature of such transactions. In Bulletin 2007-5, the Department of Insurance
interpreted the provision of Section 31 A-23a-406(l), Utah Code Annotated, stating,
In order to conduct an escrow, a title producer must be properly licensed, be
appointed by an authorized title insurer, and issue one or more title insurance
policies.
A split escrow occurs when two of the parties to a real property transaction
conduct their own portion of the escrow using two separate title producers. The
use of two separate title producers creates two separate transactions and each
separate transaction must comply with all of the requirements of an escrow.
(R. 683-684). If the split escrow constitutes two separate transactions, then it is
reasonable to interpret the duties of each title producer to extend only to the one party for
whom they are employed or the one transaction in which it is involved. See e.g. Corridor
v. Mahony, 986 So.2d 821 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/4/08). Because Brighton Title was not a title
producer to the transaction involving Cooper and its title producer, Metro National Title,
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Brighton Title did not owe any fiduciary duties to Cooper.
Cooper sued Brighton Title for breach of an alleged fiduciary duty. Had
Brighton Title complied with Cooper's required performance, Brighton Title would have
violated Utah law. There is no dispute a fiduciary must conduct itself with "scrupulous
honesty, skill and diligence." See e.g. Tucson Title Ins. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230,
234, 383 P.2d 119, 121 (1963). If such is the general standard of conduct, pregnant in
said standard is the obligation to not engage in conduct which violates the law. Cooper's
entire case is premised on the fact that regardless of the law, or its violation, Brighton
Title had the obligation to comply with the contract, even if that meant violating the law.
In Utah, illegality is a defense to contract claims. See e.g. Phone Directories Co., Inc. v.
Henderson, 2000 UT 64, 8 P.3d 256. Thus, if the transaction which Cooper relies upon
as the basis of its claim is a prohibited transaction which has been declared illegal based
on the statutes and the Department of Insurance' interpretation thereof, Brighton Title
had no duty to complete the requirements of the otherwise illegal contract.
The statutes at issue, as well as their interpretative bulletins are prophylactic.
They are designed to prevent illegal conduct, as well as provide a sanction for engaging
in such conduct. The bulletins interpreting the statutes make clear title companies are to
be aware of and look for transactions which violate the law and to not participate therein.
Cooper continually argued Brighton Title had no legal obligation to follow the
interpretations set forth in the bulletins, implying Brighton Title could simply ignore
them because they did not have the force of law. By analogy, Cooper's argument equates
to arguing that attorneys should disregard Bar Ethics Opinions because they do not have
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the force of law. While such ethics opinions may not have the force of law, no one
within the Bar would pretend that attorneys are not expected to conform their conduct to
the interpretations of these opinions. To the contrary, everyone knows that conduct in
contravention of such opinions can lead to censure and sanctions. In the instant case, the
bulletins are no different other than their application to a different industry. Within the
industry, it is undisputed all title/escrow agents are fully expected to comply with the
interpretations of statute which are embodied in the bulletins. To do otherwise is to
invent censure and sanctions.
By implication, Cooper argued and the trial court accepted the argument that
because the parties agreed to contractual terms which violate the law, the law applicable
is unenforceable. This is clearly not the case. Utah law on this point is crystal clear.
"[C]ontracts and corporate acts and transactions which are malum in se or malum
prohibitum, which contravene some rule of public policy, [or] violate some public duty . .
. are illegal and void." Hatch v. Lucky Bill Mining Co., 25 Utah 405, 71 P. 865, 866
(1903); See also Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). The clear
general rule is "every contract in violation of law is void." Castleglen, Inc., v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 984 F.2d 1571, 1582 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Baker v. Latses, 60 Utah 38,
141, 206 P. 553, 555 (1922)). The trial court ignored the clear law of the state of Utah.
If the contract is illegal, it is void. Thus, because the contract violated Utah law,
Brighton owed no duty to Cooper on the void contract.
In the instant case, the contract proposed an illegal transaction. As structured,
the transaction violated the good funds statute. Further, because Brighton Title could not
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insure the transaction, it was precluded from acting as the escrow agent on the
transaction. Regardless of generic "black letter law", the mor^ specific requirements of
the Utah Code, coupled with the Insurance Departments interpretation of those statutes
and what constituted a violation thereof, dictated the very course of conduct undertaken
by Brighton Title. The contract was illegal and Brighton Title|recognized that, thereby
refusing to further participate in the transaction. The trial couijt erred as a matter of law
in concluding that Brighton Title (a) owed a fiduciary duty to Cooper and (b) in the face
of the illegality of the proposed transaction, Brighton Title was nonetheless obligated to
release the escrowed earnest money deposit to Metro National Title, Cooper's separate
escrow agent. Thus, this Court must reverse the trial court's gjrant of summary judgment.
IV
BRIGHTON TITLE WAS NOT CONTRACTUALLY BOUND BY A CONTRACT
TO WHICH IT WAS NOT A PARTY
The trial court found Brighton Title liable based on its breach of contract to
Cooper. Brighton Title was not a party to the contract between Cooper and Deseret Sky.
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth
Vill, 2004 UT 102, \ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. The trial court erre4 as a matter of law in
holding Brighton Title liable.
Cooper and Deseret Sky entered into a Real Estate Purbhase Agreement. (R. 532541). In Addendum No. 1 to Real Estate Purchase Agreement, Cooper and Deseret Sky
agreed the earnest money would be deposited with Brighton Title. (R. 536). In
Addendum No. 2, the same parties agreed the earnest money would be deposited with
Metro National Title. (R. 538). Finally, in Addendum No. 3^ the parties finally agreed
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"All earnest money shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and shall be released
to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. MST." (R. 540). At no time did
Brighton Title sign the Real Estate Purchase Agreement nor any of the Addendums
thereto.
Brighton Title was not a party to the contract. It is only by the terms of the
contract Cooper could elect liquidated damages in the amount of the earnest money.
Because Cooper made that election under the terms of the contract, its relief pursuant to
that contract was limited to a judgment against the Deseret Sky as the only other party to
that contract. Because Brighton Title was not a party to the contract, Cooper could not
elect liquidated damages against Brighton Title.
To the contrary, in order to recover anything against Brighton Title, Cooper had to
prove actual damages. In the instant case, Cooper failed to provide any evidence to the
trial court regarding its actual damages. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law
in granting summary judgment to Cooper.
Before Cooper is entitled to damages, whether liquidated or actual, it had the duty
to establish the existence of a duty, its breach, and that the breach proximately caused it
damages. In the instant case, as it relates to Brighton, Cooper has failed to prove any of
those elements. But most significantly, it failed to prove proximate cause. The
proximate cause of Cooper's damages, if any, was its own failure to purchase the
Property from Hansen. Absent any title ownership, it could not be damaged by the
failure of a subsequent sale [of something it did not own].
Second, the law on liquidated damages is clear. Not only must the Plaintiff
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establish that the liquidated damages provision is reasonable, it must also establish that
damages are otherwise difficult to calculate. See e.g. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137,
292 P. 206,211 and Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P l d 446 (1952). In the
instant case, the damages were not difficult to a calculate, as evidenced by the Cooper's
calculation of the damages to the very last dollar. (R. 201).
The Plaintiff is not entitled to any damages. It did not it the time and has never
owned the property. The only actual damages which the Plaintiff suffered was its alleged
loss of its earnest money paid to Hansen. However, the proximate cause of those damage
was Cooper's inability to independently procure the property hrough the use of its own
funds, as required by Utah law. Had Cooper so been able, this case would never have
been brought before this Court. Rather, Cooper would have tjeen on title and the
transaction would not have been an illegal flip.
The shameful reality of this case is that Cooper, with1 mud caked hands, believes
it is entitled to liquidated damages under its illegal contract, because somehow they were
sufficiently shifty to effectively tie up a parcel of real property until it had a buyer who
could fund the transaction. Cooper requested the trial court ignore the law and it did so.
But as importantly, Cooper asked the trial court to ignore the ireality—at no time, even up
through the date of this brief, has Cooper ever owned the subject property. Despite its
misrepresentation in the REPC it held fee title, Cooper argues it has been damaged. This
argument could hold water if, and only if, Cooper had acquired title to the property.
Cooper never did. So the question became, should the trial court grant a six figure
judgment for breach of contract for the sale of real property which the seller never owned
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where the transaction was illegal under Utah law? The answer should have been clear. It
should not. Despite this clarity, the trial court ignored the facts, ignored the law, and
granted summary judgment to Cooper. It should be reversed.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT TO COOPER WHEN
IT BREACHED THE CONTRACT BY ITS AFFIRMATIVE
MISREPRESENTATION THAT IT HELD FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY
Cooper breached the REPC at the point of its execution and was the party first in
breach. The trial court erred in granting judgment to Cooper when it did not and never
has held fee title to the property, but nonetheless affirmatively represented it held fee
title. This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah
Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^ 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Cooper never held title to the
property and was the party first in breach, the Court erred in granting Cooper judgment as
a matter of law.
Utah law is clear. "The law is well settled that a material breach by one party to
a contract excuses farther performance by the non-breaching party." Holbrook v. Master
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). What constitutes a material
breach is a question of fact. Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug
Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 458 (Utah App. 1994). However, the Utah Supreme Court has
added clarity in defining a material breach, stating, u a failure of performance which
defeats the very object of the contract or [is] of such prime importance that the contract
would not have been made if default in that particular had been contemplated is a
material failure." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). In the
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instant case, the very object of the contract was the sale of real property. At no time did
Cooper own the real property. This lack of ownership was a material breach because
Deseret Sky most certainly would not have agreed to purchase the property from Cooper
had it known at the time of the execution of the Real Estate Purchase Agreement Cooper
did not own the property. As such, Cooper's material breach excused all performance
under the terms of the contract, including any obligations which may have been owed by
Brighton Title. In the context of the sale of real property, the lack of ownership of the
property by the seller as a matter of law should be declared a material prior breach.
Moreover, the ownership of the property by the seller should be a condition
precedent to any performance obligations on the part of the purchaser. The ownership is
a condition precedent to any requirement from the buyer to purchase the property. MA
condition precedent may qualify the existence of an entire contract or only the
performance of a contractual duty. Where only the performance of a duty is qualified by
the condition, failure of the condition excuses that performance only and the remaining
provisions of the contract remain in effect." Quealy v. Anderson, 114 P.2d 667, 673
(Utah 1986). In the instant action, the condition precedent failed. Cooper was not the
owner of the property at the time it represented it owned fee title to the property. (R.
641). The condition precedent to Deseret Sky's obligation to burchase failed. As such,
the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Cooper summary judgment. Because
Deseret Sky's obligation to perform was excused by Cooper's lack of fee title to the
property, Brighton Title was similarly excused. Summary judgment should be reversed.
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VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING
THAT COOPER DID NOT HAVE TO BE IN TITLE DURING THE
EXECUTORY PERIOD WHEN COOPER HAD NO ABILITY TO GET IN TITLE
ABSENT THE FUNDS FROM THE DESERET SKY CLOSING.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Cooper did not have to be in
title during the executory period, when Cooper had no independent ability to get in title
absent the funds from the Deseret Sky closing. This issue presents a question of law
which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill, 2004 UT 102, If 17, 104 P.3d
1242. Because Cooper could not use Deseret Sky's funds to close its transaction with
Hansen without violating Utah law, there was no evidence before the Court that Cooper
could have gotten title at during the executory period.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Cooper argued it was not required under
Utah law to be in title during the entire executory period, based on the law as set forth in
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1981). While this is a correct statement, it
nonetheless fails to fully explain Neves and also misapplies the requirements of the Court
in Neves. Simply put, Neves stands for the proposition that while Cooper did not have to
be in title during the entire executory period, in a fact specific, case by case inquiry, the
Seller was required to be able to convey clear title when the final payment was due.
Because of the structure of the instant transaction, Cooper was not in the position to do
so.
The rule in Neves was premised on early Utah cases which define the contours of
the holding in Neves. For instance, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909), the
Court ruled the governing principle was "whether the title was beyond the control of the
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vendor so that his acts amounted to a repudiation of his contract." Id. at 669-70. The
Neves Court stated
A defect which, by its nature cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter
is one "of such a nature that the vendor neither has title "nor in a practical sense
any prospect of acquiring it'
Neves at 1200 citing to Davis v. Dean Vincent, Inc., 255 Or. 2$3, 465 P.2d 702 (1970)
and Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951). t h e Neves Court further
stated, "it is essential that in t u i \ case tlu u l>\ a i lose s< iu1in\ il Ihe facts, and llie rale
must be carefully applied to avoid unfairness, sharp practice, ^nd outright dishonesty."
Id. at 1199.
Cooper suggested to the trial court that it should apply the geneial mle, in a
mannc i w hit li pi < >i n< >tes unfairness, shaip practice and outright dishonesty. It is
undisputed on the date the parties entered into the REPC, Coqper did not have fee title.
(R.199-200; Ml; 532-541). It is further undisputed Cooper's .purchase of the property
from Hansen required Coopei use pail ol the mone\ paid by Deseret Sk\ 1o • ompiete its
acquisition of title. (R. 551-552).
A close scrutiny of the undisputed facts, leads to a single conclusion. Specifically,
Cooper could not as a practical inaltci remove the defect, i.e. its la* k of let title, before
Deseret Sky performed by paying the money. As such, its inability to convey title
justified Deseret Sky's lack of performance. Further, these s$me defects left Brighton no
choice but to withdraw lioin the transaction md leiuucl tlu money on dqxMt to its
tlepositot Deseiet Sk1 IV\e1opnn nl
Cooper requested the Trial Court grant it relief based 0n the terms of the contract,
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asking the Courl to ignore Cooper's own material breach of the contract at the time of its
making. Specifically, in the REPC, Cooper represented it had fee title to the property.
There were no qualifiers or conditions on that representation. This representation was at
the time of its making false. Further, it has remained false from that day through today.
At no time has Cooper had fee title to the subject property.
If Cooper did not have fee title, Brighton Title, who was responsible in part for
insuring the transaction and the title, could not insure the property. Because Brighton
could not insure the property, it could not act as escrow agent. Regardless of what the
contract may have stated, the law states otherwise. The trial court erred as a matter of
law in granting summary judgment to Cooper who materially breached the contract
excusing all performance by both Brighton Title and Deseret Sky.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING BRIGHTON TITLE
BREACHED ITS DUTY TO COOPER WHERE THE TRANSACTION WAS AN
ILLEGAL FLIP
The instant transaction was an illegal flip. Because the transaction was illegal, the
trial court erred in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper. This issue
presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004
UT 102, ^f 17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because the transaction was precluded as a matter of law,
Brighton Title did not breach its duty to Cooper by refusing to participate in the
transaction.
The instant transaction amounted to an illegal flip in which Brighton Title could
not participate. As such, Brighton Title had no choice but to withdraw from the
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transaction and refund the money on deposit to its depositor, Deseret Sky.
A flip transaction is one in which the owner of a parcel )f real property ("Seller
A") intends to sell it to a buyer ("Buyer A") who intends to imlmediately resell the
property to a subsequent buver ("Buyer B")

\ Ihp It tn > i tionnm eiflu i In I c i l u r

illegal. A legal flip transaction occurs where Buyer A brings tb the table its own
independent funds and completes the purchase from Seller A i|n its entirety separately
from the subsequent sale to Buyer H

NM

I A-23a-4Un Utah t ode Annotated K ^u 153-

i>, and Bulletin 200/-I. A ilip tiansaction stiuctuied in this fashion is entirely legal.
An illegal flip transaction arises when Buyer A relies on the funds from Buyer B
to purchase the property from Sella A §31 A-23a-4()f>, Utah Pode Annotated; IJ ^90li>3-i>; and Bulletin 200/-I. 1 he instant ti insaction n a >
• an illegal I lip Ivtausel oopci
was relying on the funds provided from Deseret Sky to complete the purchase of the
property from Hansen. (R. 551-552).
Because tin tiansaction was an illegal Hip BiHilon lith A a^ specifically
precluded from participating by both the statutes of the State (if Utah as well as the
Department of Insurance interpretations of those statutes as sdt forth in its bulletin. The
mal i unit ened as a nutttei ol law in granting sumniai s judgment
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING
THAT A TITLE COMPANY MAY ACT AS AN ESCROW AGENT IN A
TRANSACTION IT C 4NNOT INSURE
Brighton I ill* a< Inl is liolli an in.nn i HHICSUIW igenl HI ihh dansai linn
trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that in such circumstances. Brighton
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I In

Title could act as the escrow agent in a transaction it could not insure. This issue presents
a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^
17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, it could not
participate in that transaction in any way.
It is undisputed that Brighton could not insure the transaction, because it was a
prohibited flip transaction as set forth in Bulletin 2007-1. Because it could not provide
insurance on the transaction, it was prohibited by the terms of Bulletin 2007-5 from
conducting any part of the split closing without violating the Departments interpretation
of the relevant provision of the Utah Code. As such, Brighton Title had no choice but to
return the funds on deposit to their depositor, because to do otherwise would have
violated the law.
Further, pursuant to Section 31A-23a-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended), if a title agent cannot issue a title insurance policy, they are prohibited by law
from conducting the escrow. As soon as the underwriter refused to insure the transaction,
Brighton Title was prohibited by law from conducting escrow services on the transaction.
The facts were not in dispute before the trial court. Brighton Title's underwriter
refused to insure the transaction because it was an illegal flip which violated Utah law.
(R. 571-573). Because Brighton Title could not insure the transaction, it was not able to
act as escrow agent on the transaction. Moreover, as previously stated, the transaction in
its entirety was illegal. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting Cooper
summary judgment.
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IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING BRIGHTON TITLE VIOLATED
RULE 7(C)(3)(B), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling Brighton Title violated Rule
7(c)(3)(B) oit he I it ill Rules of Civil Procedure. A tnal court'ls interpretation of the rales
of civil procedure presents a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah
Youth VilL, 2004 111 1 f U. 1| I

I 0 J I1 ul I ' I

Brighton Title did not seek to controvert

the facts set forth h ( oupei rather it created a genuine issue Of material hk I Ihmugh the
addition of facts not presented by Cooper.
In its Minute Entry, the Court stated that "Defendant Brighton Title Company's
responsive memoiauduni iaik d 1m uinph ^ iih llu u i|inrements of Rule ^(i )(3)( B) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs
statement of undisputed facts is uncontroverted, and that there1 is no genuinue issue of
material fact in dispute " (R 707-709). After Brighton Title objected, I he < oui I enteied
a clarifying order stating it noted the violation but did not use the violation as a basis for
granting summary judgment. (R. 783).
Brighton Title did not violate Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules o! i i\ il Procedure.
Specifically, tin*, mile slates
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall a verbatim
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, and ma)
contain a separate statement of additional facts in dispute. For each of the moving
party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party shall provide an explanation
of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as
affidavit or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and Numbered and supported by
citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
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Id. In the instant case, Brighton Title did not violate the rule because it did not controvert
the facts contained in the moving party's memorandum. Rule 7(c)(3)(b)?s verbatim
requirement is only applicable if the facts are controverted. Where they are not, the
verbatim requirement does not apply based on the plain reading of the rule.
In the instant case, as clearly shown above, the facts Cooper presented were not in
dispute. While Brighton Title submitted additional facts which created a genuine issue of
material fact, it nonetheless did not have the obligation to comply with the verbatim
statement requirements of Rule Rule 7(c)(3)(b).
Brighton understands that if Rule 7(c)(3)(b) is violated, a Court has discretion
based on that violation, to deem all facts admitted. See e.g. Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT
App 291, 77 P.3d 339 (interpreting Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration the
predecessor provision to Rule 7(c)(3)(b)). However, the strict formatting requirements
have been referred to as technical requirements which may be dispensed of when there
has been substantial compliance with the intent of the rule. See e.g. Salt Lake County v.
Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, 89 P.2d 155 fn. 4 and Gary Porter Const, v.
Fox Const, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371. As noted by the Court in the Fox
Construction case quoting from Metro Ready Mix case,
Opposing memorandum [does] not set forth disputed facts listed in numbered
sentences in a separate section as required [by the rule, as long as] the disputed
facts [are] clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable record
references,... failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 4501(2)(B) [is] harmless.
Fox Constr. at 376 quoting Metro Ready Mix at fn. 4. Were the foregoing not sufficient,
in Govrnt Trust v. Machinery, 2006 UT App 513, 154 P.3d 175, fn 5, the Court
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recognized the uncertainty of the state of the law regarding noncompliance1 w itli f' tile 7's
technical requirements.
Regardless of that state of uncertainty, Rule 7 simply has no application where the
nnnmowng party u iml innlion itin^ tlie facts asserted in the memorandum m support of
summary judgment. Unless facts are being controverted, there is no verbatim
requirement. The trial court erred as a matter of law in even suggesting that Brighton
Title did not comply with the Requirements of Rule 7(C)O)0VL 1 Ttali Rules ol ( M it
Proceduie
Even assuming that Rule 7(c)(3)(b) had been violated, the consequences of any
such violation are set forth in Rule 7(c)(3)(a). Under this provision, "Each fact set lorlh
n I In in n i niz pai 1 \ "s memotandmn e doomed admit ti d I* i pui poses ot -uinniai u
judgment unless controverted by the responding party." As such, because a failure to
comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(b) results in facts being deemed admitted, any such violation
resolves only the question of whelhet then1 are facts in di putewhi li \M mid utlierw ise
preclude the grant of summary judgment. It does not in anywav address the application
of those facts to the applicable law. No court is justified in granting summary judgment
as a in ittei ot law ha ad on in allu ul mlation of Rule 7(c)(3)(b) * iilmnl pun uling the
legal analysis to support its decision. The trial court erred as a matter of law with respect
to its application of Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to Brighton Title's
memorandum A\ I tie it thereafter attempted to "correct" that misapplication, it did so in
a vacuum oflegal leasomn^.
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X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO
PROVIDE ANY ANALYSIS OR REASONING IN GRANTING COOPER
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN SIGNING THE RULING
PREPARED BY COOPER
The trial court err as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to provide
any analysis or reasoning in granting Cooper summary judgment. This issue presents a
question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah Youth VilL, 2004 UT 102, ^j
17, 104 P.3d 1242. Absent some analysis and reasoning by the Court, the parties are left
in an absolute vacuum. This vacuum precludes any meaningful appellate review, leaving
this Court with no choice but to remand to a trial court. Further, after failing to provide
the parties with any insight into the basis of its decision, the trial court erred as a matter
of law in signing the ruling prepared by Cooper.
Following briefing, the trial court granted summary judgment to Cooper. The
minute entry cited the alleged violation of Rule 7(c)(3)(b) and stated based on that
violation, there were no genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (R. 707-08).

It entered judgment against Brighton Title

and Deseret Sky and ordered Cooper's counsel to prepare an "order consistent with this
ruling." (R. 707-08). Brighton Title immediately file a motion for clarification. (R. 710729). During the briefing, Brighton Title's counsel received a proposed judgment and
ruling. Brighton Title immediately file an objection to both. (R. 739-741 and 742-745).
After briefing, the Court entered another minute entry. (R. 783-788). In this
minute entry, the Court clarified its prior minute entry. The clarification reads:
I have received and reviewed the briefing on Defendant, Brighton Title Company,
46

LLC's motion for clarification and reconsideration of the prior ruling on summary
judgment. While I decline to reconsider arguments I fully considered previously, I
will clarify my prior ruling as follows:
1.
Brighton Title's failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 7 was
noted, but that was not the basis for the ruling.
2.
Since there was no material issues of fact, the matter was decided on the
law. Brighton Title accepted earnest money in its capacity as the escrow agent for
the real estate transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Deseret Sky. Pursuant
to the terms of the contract, and the undisputed facts, the money became nonrefundable when it was not timely cancelled or objection made by Deseret Sky.
Again, pursuant to the terms of the contract and undisputed fact, Brighton Title
became obligation to forward the funds to Metro National Title. Instead, it
refunded the money to Deseret Sky, in violation of its obligation to Plaintiff.
While Brighton Title may have been concerned about Plaintiffs ability to
obtain title to the subject property, it was not entitled to make its own
determination about the rights or claims of the respective parties; it was obligated
to fulfill its contractual and fiduciary duties as the escrow agent. (The Court notes
that Brighton Title had an option of paying the funds into the Court, and allowing
the other parties to litigate the issues, but chose not to do so.)
The Bulletin referenced by Brighton Title does not have the force of law,
and cannot be used to excuse Brighton Title's failure to perform. Pursuant to the
undisputed facts, the real estate purchase contract did not violate any provision of
Utah law.
Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties, when it
agreed to hold the funds as escrow agent. Refunding the money to Deseret Sky
violated its duties, causing damage to Plaintiff in the amount of the escrowed
funds
I have received an Amended Notice to Submit, tiled by Plamtitt, relative to
the form of the Judgment, as well as to the issue of attorney fees. Since I have
issued this clarification to the earlier minute entry, I ask both counsel to review the
proposed Judgment and determine if there may be an agreement as to the form. If
not, Plaintiff is requested to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of the
Judgment, so that the pleadings filed in connection with the objection may be
reviewed in substance.
The Minute Entry is the Ordei of the Court, and no additional Uidei is
required to be prepared on this clarification.
(R 783-84). Despite the clear instruction of the Court, Cooper submitted a detailed
ruling which the Court ultimately stated was consistent with its decision and decided to
sign. (R X()?-8(n and 804-828).
First, the trial court absolutely erred as a matter of law in granting summarv
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judgment without so much as a single stitch of legal reasoning or analysis to support its
decision. But for the motion for clarification, neither this Court nor Brighton Title would
have had any idea the basis upon which the Court concluded judgment was appropriately
granted to Cooper. This Court should specifically clarify the duty of a trial court judge
when granting summary judgment concerning its legal reasoning and basis for such a
grant.
Second, despite the Court having entered minute entries amounting to nothing
more than three or four pages which consisted of both its decision and subsequent
explanation of that decision, Cooper submitted a twenty four (24) page ruling which
amounted to a verbatim reiteration of its memorandum in support of motion for summary
judgment. While the Court signed the same after yet another minute entry, its doing so
was an abuse of discretion. First, the Court never requested a ruling be submitted.
Second, when the proposed Ruling was submitted, objections were lodged. Third, after
clarifying its decision in another brief minute entry, Cooper took it upon itself to
extrapolate a decision for the Court, taking two pages of substantive explanation and
churning them into a twenty four (24) page ruling for which the Court had provided
absolutely no basis. Overruling the objection, the Court signed the unsolicitated Ruling.
Brighton Title does not believe a Court's lack of legal reasoning, analysis or
conclusions can be cured by a simple instruction to the prevailing party to prepare an
order consistent with the Court's ruling. Any such order which does anything more than
recite the Court's ruling is objectionable.
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Obviously, the Court's responsibility with respect to making findings and
conclusions when rendering a decision on summary judgment must be viewed in the
context of a potential appeal. In that context, "An appellate court reviews a trial court's
"legal OIK lusion ^ uul ultinuU „ unt ni dun il oi sunini u s judgment1 for correctness,
and views "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn thereftom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.1" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 U^ 2, ^ 6, 177 P.3d 600
(quoting Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231,233 (Utah 1993)). Howe\u where
the Couit hilt d to make any findings oi piovide its legal conclusions, but only ultimately
granted summary judgment, there is no basis for an appellate court to make such a
review.
The trial

mil does not ha\ i Itu dut lo nuil i i lmdin<> noi on lusion, on

every issue presented. However, it must make sufficient findings and conclusions so the
appellate Court can understand how it reached its ultimate conclusion. Consolidation
Coal Co. v Utah Div of State Lands & Forestry, 8b(» P M ^ I I

h I I ill I ' ^ I

inal

court's conclusions of law must be supported by its findings of fact. See Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co , 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989); 9 Charles A.'Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure, § 2579 (1971).
It is imperative the trial court make its conclusions oft law known, even in cases
where there are no disputed facts. Foi instance, the Utah Supreme Court granted a
petition for certioi i in / PochynokCo. v. Smedsrud, '(Xh 111 V) I Id p ul 553, and
obsent d tin d ul u ml h id in ill in lindiny4 of lac 1 ot t * m lusion

t 1 i \ to explain il

attorney fees decision. See id at Tf 5. Consequently, the partiessand the court v\ ere left to
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conjecture in determining the trial court's reasoning. The Utah Supreme Court stated "Our
difficulty is with the trial court's process, not necessarily the outcome." Id. at ^J 13.
The instant case is no different. Unlike the case where a Court holds a hearing
and explains the basis of its decision from the bench, and thereafter orders counsel for the
prevailing party to prepare an Order consistent with those findings and conclusion orally
proclaimed, in the instant case there was no hearing. There was no oral proclamation.
There were no written conclusions. As such, there was no meaningful basis for an
appellate court to review the trial court's decision. Once the Court clarified its decision,
it was no less of an abuse of discretion for the Court to permit Cooper to submit an order
which reiterated his summary judgment motion but was not consistent with the Court's
Minute Entry.
The problem which is inherent with the failure of the court to specify its
conclusions of law is made clear when considered in the context of Rule 7(f)(2), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule states:
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon
the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision.
Objections to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The
party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
Id, [emphasis supplied]. In the instant case, an order in conformity with the Court's
decision is both short and to the point.

It cannot be a twenty six (26) page wish list

which assumes the Court adopted wholesale the memoranda filed by the moving party,
which is what has now been submitted to the Court. The Court erred as matter of law in
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both failing to provide sufficient legal analysis and reasoning to support its decision. It
erred again in approving and executing a ruling which was submitted without leave of the
Court and was not in conformity with the Court's express decision.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CONCLUDING
BRIGHTON TITLE DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
ATTORNEY FEE AWARD

Brighton ' I itle, as a defendant in tl lis actioi i, had "standing" to pai ticipate in the
action. This right to participate included the right to challenge the reasonableness of the
attorney fees. The Court ruled Brighton Title did not have standing. This issue presents
a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Savage v. Utah You:* I •" . 'n-:M :

)2,^[

17, 104 P.3d 1242. Because Brighton Title was a defendant in this action, standing is not
strictly applicable and it could challenge all issues in the litigation.
The standard for an award of attorney fees is clear. It is within this Court's
discretion to determine what fees are reasonable. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 t.zd
985, 988 (Utah 1988) However, an award of attorney fees must be supported by
evidence in the record. Associated Indus. Dev., Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 : .~d 4Mi. 4VN •; l. lai
1984); Bangerterv / \ mhon, 663 P.2< i 100, 103 H * • • iyz±)\see Cabren i v. Cottrell, 694
P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) ("award of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis
of findings of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate Conclusions of law");
Jenkin s v. Bailey, 676 P 2d 391 393 (I Jtaii 1984) (abuse of disci etion foi trial coi n t to
award three times more than the amount of fees supported by the evidence); Hal Taylor
Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750-51 (Utah 1982) (since party did not
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present evidence on issue of attorney fees at trial, trial court did not commit error in
declining to make an award).
Part of the trial court's discretion involves evaluation of the evidence presented.
In addition, the trial court is allowed to reduce the amount asserted by one party in
determining a reasonable fee. See, e.g., Appliance & Heating Supply, Inc. v. Telaroli, 682
P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1984); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982).
In Trayner v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), the Court enlarged the list of
potential factors by including "the relationship of the fee to the amount recovered, the
novelty and difficulty of the issues involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity
of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights under the contract." Id. at 858 (citing Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982)).
Finally, in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 69A P.2d 622 (Utah 1983), which contains our
most detailed analysis of attorney fees to date, the Court added
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the
case, the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee
customarily charged in the locality for similar services, the amount involved in
the case and the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the attorneys
involved.

Id. at 625.
In Dixie State, the Court set forth four questions which must be answered in
addressing attorney fees. The Court's questions included:
Although all of the above factors maybe explicitly considered in determining a
reasonable fee, as a practical matter the trial court should find answers to four
questions:
1. What legal work was actually performed?
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2. How much of the work performed was reasonably hecessar} ^ 'idequately
prosecute the matter?
\
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in
the locality for similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require consideraticjn of additional factors,
including those listed in the Code of Professional Resbonsibility?

I i at 991.
A review of the affidavit and supporting documentation reveals that Cooper's
counsel for the Plaintiff failed to answer all of the questions.

Specificall>, counsel

failed to specifically itemize each service1 nr.-\ iJ^! kainei , he lumped matters together,
thereby precluding any ability to differentiate the time allottee to each particular task
performed.
As such Miij/hloii \\\\^x ohftvfeci lu (hr awan) of .ittnrnry firs cvm though the
judgment was not entered against Brighton Title. The Court ienied the objection ruling
Brighton Title lacked standing to object. (R. 786-787). Thii» ruling was in error. Issues
regarding standing pK->ent questions of law I hah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. I hah Air
Quality Bd.9 2006 UT 74?fflf13-15, 148 P.3d 960.
Tn Utah, standing is generally conferred upon a party vfho has ,f>a personal stake in
the outcome of the dispute."1" Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan,
2003 UT 58, \ 20, 82 P.3d 1125 (quoting National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board
of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993)). The vast maionty of Utah standing law
has developed in the context of evaluating a plaintiffs <ii-ii'ty to prosecute a claim, not a
defendants ability to defend against it Ii I fa :±, a re\ iev - ot the standing cases in I Jtah do
not reveal any cases where a defendant was precluded from defending against anv part of
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the case because they lacked standing. As noted by the Court in Knight v. Alabama, 14
F.3d 1534, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994), l?[I]t is not generally required that a defendant have any
particular 'standing5 in order to be sued in a trial court. . . . " As such, contrary to the
unsupported assertion of Cooper, Brighton Title does not need to have standing. Once
Cooper sued Brighton Title, Brighton Title had the right to folly defend every aspect of
the case. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Brighton Title lacked
standing to challenge the award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court. The Court erred in granting summary
judgment because there were both genuine issues of material fact and Cooper was not
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding Brighton Title was not bound to follow the Utah Insurance Department's
bulletins. The trial court erred in concluding in the context of a split closing a title
company owes a fiduciary duty to both parties to the transaction especially when the
transaction especially when the transaction illegal. Brighton Title was not contractually
bound by a conlract to which it was not a party. The trial court erred in granting
judgment to Cooper when it breached the contract by its affirmative misrepresentations
that it held fee title to the property. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding
that Cooper did not have to be on title during the executor period when Cooper had no
ability to be get on title absent fonds from the Deseret Sky closing. The trial court erred
in concluding Brighton Title breached its duty to Cooper where the transaction was an
illegal flip. The trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that a title company
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may act as an escrow agent in a transaction it cannot insure. The trial court erred in
ruling Brighton Title violated Rule 7(c)(3)(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial
court erred as a matter of law by failing to provide any analysis or reasoning m granting
Cooper summary judgment and in signing the i tiling prepaied by Coopei. finally, the
trial court erred as a matter of law concluding Brighton Title did not have standing to
challenge the attorney fee award. As such, this Court should reverse the trial court and
rem.mil foi iuitht t pioi codings.
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7.

Minute Entry dated March 1 (\ 2009;
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llulin j Dii Plaintiffs Motion l< i Suniniaix Judgment and Defendant
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Brighton Title Company's Countermotion
For Summary Judgment.

I®r

Dated and^Jigned this \__ day of June, 2009.

Adam IStowelfow PLLC
Attorneys for Appellant, Brighton Title
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Douglas L. Stowell, 6659
Adam L. Crayk, 9443
STOWELL LAW, PLLC
525 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 944-3459
Facsimile: (801) 483-0705
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Title insurance producer's business

A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of
Mowing exist:
a) the title insurance producer is licensed with:
(i) the title line of authority; and
(ii) the escrow subline of authority;
b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer authorized to do business
he state;
:) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction:
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance;
1)(i) all funds deposited with the title insurance producer in connection with any escrow:
(A) are deposited:
(I) in a federally insured financial institution; and
(II) in a trust account that is separate from all other trust account funds that are
not related to real estate transactions; and
(B) are the property of the persons entitled to them under the provisions of the
escrow; and
(ii) are segregated escrow by escrow in the records of the title insurance producer;
i) earnings on funds held in escrow may be paid out of the escrow account to any
son in accordance with the conditions of the escrow; and
) the escrow does not require the title insurance producer to hold:
(i) construction funds; or
(ii) funds held for exchange under Section 1031, Internal Revenue Code. ]
Notwithstanding Subsection (li, a title insurance producer,may engage in the esci'ow
;ss if:
0 the escrow involves:
(i) a mobile home;
(ii) a grazing right;
(iii) a water right; or
(iv) other personal property authorized by the commissioner; and
0 the title insurance producer complies with all the requirements of this section except
,he requirement of Subsection (l)(c).
Funds held in escrow:
) are not subject to any debts of the title insurance producer;
i) may only be used to fulfill the terms of the individual escrow under which the funds
3 accepted; and
) may not be used until all conditions of the escrow have been met.
Assets or property other than escrow funds received by a title insurance producer in
ance with an escrow shall be maintained in a manner that will:
) reasonably preserve and protect the asset or property from loss, theft, or damages;
) otherwise comply with all general duties and responsibilities of a fiduciary or bailee.
235

§ 31A-23a-406

INSURANCE CODE

(5Ka) A check from the trust account described in Subsection-('Did) may not be drawn,
executed, or dated, or funds otherwise disbursed unless the segregated escrow account from
which funds are to be disbursed contains a sufficient, credit balance consisting of collected or
cleared funds at the time the check is drawn, executed, or dated, or funds are othenvise
disbursed.
(b) As used in this Subsection (5), funds are considered to be "collected or cleared," and
may be disbursed as follows:
(i) cash ma\- be disbursed on the same day the cash is deposited;
(ii) a wire transfer may be disbursed On the same day the wire transfer is deposited;
(hi) the following may be disbursed on the dav following the date of deposit:
(A) a cashiers check;
(B) a certified check;
(C) a teller's check;
(D) a U.S. Postal Service money order; and
(E) a check drawn on a Federal Reseiwe Bank or Federal Home Loan Bank: and
(iv) any other check or deposit may be disbursed:
(A) within the time limits provided under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12
U.vS.C. Section 4001 et seq., as amended, and related regulations of the Federal
Reserve System; or
(B) upon written notification from the financial institution to which the funds have
been deposited, that final settlement has occurred on the deposited item.
(c) Subject to Subsections (5)(.a) and (b), any material change to a settlement statement
made after the final closing documents are 'executed must be authorized or acknowledged
by date and signature on each page of the settlement statement by the one or more persons
affected by the change before disbursement of funds.
(6) The title insurance producer shall maintain records of all receipts and disbursements of
escrow funds.
(7) The title insurance produce}- shall comply with:
(a) Section 31A-23a-409;
(b.) Title 46, Chapter 1. Notaries Public Reform Act; and
(c) any rules adopted by the Title and Escrow Commission , subject to Section
31A-2-404, that govern escrows.
Laws 1985. c. 242, § 28; Laws 1989, c. 94, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 164. § 1: Laws 1997, c. 185, § 11. etf. July
1. 1997; Laws 2001, c. 116. S 148, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002. c. 308, § 56, eft May 6. 2002; Laws
2003, c. 298. § 66, eff. May 5, 3003; Laws 2004, c. 117. § 5, eff. Mav 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 124, § 7, eff.
May 2. 2005; Laws 2005. c. 185. § 11, eff. July 1, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 325, § 10, eff. April 30, 2007..
Codifications C. 1953, § 31A-23-307.
i 26 U.S.C.A. § 1031.

Historical and Statutory Notes
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2005, c.
124, § 7 and Laws 2005, c. 185. § 11.
Cross References
Title and escrow commission, see § 31A-2-401
et seq.
§ 31A-23a-415. Assessment on title insurance agencies or title insurers
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Premium" is as defined in Subsection 59-9-101(3).
(b) "Title insurer'1 means a person:
(i) making any contract or policy of title insurance as:
(A) insurer;

D KENT MICHIE
Insurance Commissioner
Utah Insuiuice Department

JON M HUNTSMAN, JR
Governor

BULLETIN 2007-1

To:

All Title Insurance Insurers, Agencies and Producers

From:

D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner,
and the Title and Escrow Commission

Subject:

Prohibited Escrow Settlement Closing Transactions

Due to the large number of "land flip" transactions and the use by real estate agents of the
Simultaneous Closing Addendum to Real Estate Purchase Contract (a copy of which is attached),
and due to the fact that "flipping" real estate often involves fraud, the Utah Insurance
Commissioner and the Title and Escrow Commission have determined the following structure to
be the only permitted method of acting as escrow wherein the same parcel of property is
purchased and then immediately sold.
The transactions effected by this bulletin are those transactions in which Seller "A" contracts
with Buyer "Bl" to sell a parcel of property. Buyer "B" then contracts with Buyer "C v to sell the
same parcel of property. Buyer "B" anticipates acquiring the parcel and selling the parcel at or
near the same time.
The transaction between Seller "A" and Buyer "B" must close independently from the
transaction between Buyer 'TT and Buyer CkC." The funds deposited by Buyer "C" may not be
used to fund the closing between Seller "A" and Buyer "B." Buyer '*B" must provide funds
independent of the funds generated by Buyer "C."
A policy of title insurance must be issued in the Seller "A" to Buyer "B" transaction and in the
Buyer "B" to Buyer "C" transaction. Each real estate transaction must stand on its own. Buyer
U
B" must close with Buyer "B's" own good funds and record so that Buyer "B" is in title prior to
the second transaction closing and recording.
The above structure insures compliance with 31A-23a-406 and R590-153-5.
31A-23a-406. Title insurance producer's business.
(1) A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of the
following exist:

(a) the title insurance producer is licensed with:

(i) the title line of authority; and
(ii) the escrow subline of authority;
(b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer authorized to do business in the
state;
(c) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction:
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance;
(5) (a) A check from the trust account described in Subsection (l)(d) may not be drawn,
executed, or dated, or funds otherwise disbursed unless the segregated escrow account from
which funds are to be disbursed contains a sufficient credit balance consisting of collected or
cleared funds at the time the check is drawn, executed, or dated, or fbnds are otherwise
disbursed.
(b) As used in this Subsection (5), funds are considered to be ''collected or cleared," and may
be disbursed as follows:
(i) cash may be disbursed on the same day the cash is deposited;
(ii) a wire transfer may be disbursed on the same day the wire transfer is deposited;
(iii) the following may be disbursed on the day following the datfe of deposit:
(A) a cashier's check;
(B) a certified check;
(C) a teller's check;
(D) a U.S. Postal Service money order; and
(E) a check drawn on a Federal Reserve Bank or Federal Home Loan Bank; and
(iv) any other check or deposit may be disbursed:
(A) within the time limits provided under the Expedited Funds Availability Act, 12 U.S.C.
Section 4001 et seq., as amended, and related regulations of the Federal Reserve System; or
(B) upon written notification from the financial institution to which the funds have been
deposited, that final settlement has occurred on the deposited item.
(c) Subject to Subsections (5)(a) and (b), any material change to a settlement statement made
after the final closing documents are executed must be authorized or acknowledged by date and
signature on each page of the settlement statement by the one or mpre persons affected by the
change before disbursement of funds."

R590-153-5. Unfair Methods of Competition, Acts and Practices.
The commissioner finds that providing or offering to provide any of the following benefits by
parties identified in Section R590-153-3 to any client, either directly or indirectly, except as
specifically allowed in Section R5 90-153-6 below, is a material and unfair inducement to obtaining
title insurance business and constitutes an unfair method of competition in the business of title
insurance prohibited under Section 31 A-23a-402:
E. Deferring or waiving any payment for insurance or services otherwise due and payable,
including "holding for resale."

LEGAL FLIPS

Part 1

Part 2

There is nothing wrong with buying
property to sell for a profit...
even in the short term.

ILLEGAL FLIPS / EQUITY SKIMMING

Part 1

Part 2

•^mm^

> There is a violation of the "good funds" (collected &
cleared by bank) statute if you use proceeds from Buyer "C"
to fund Seller "A".
> Buyer "B" is selling property to "C," which buyer UB" does
not yet hold title to.

Dated this 30th day of January 2007.

D. KENT MICHEE
Utah Insurance Commissioner

Bulletin 2007 - 5
To:
From:
Date:
Subject:

All Title Insurers, Title Agencies, and Title Producers
D. Kent Michie, Utah Insurance Commissioner
June 14,2007
Prohibited Split Escrows

The purpose of this bulletin is to clarify for all persons conducting a split escrow those
split escrows that are prohibited. This bulletin supersedes all prior communications to the
title industry reference a split escrow.
Utah Code Annotated (U.C.A.) Subsection 31 A-23a-406 (1) states as follows:
(1) A title insurance producer may do escrow involving real property transactions if all of
the following exist:
(a) the title insurance producer is licensed with:
(i) the title line of authority; and
(ii) the escrow subline of authority;
(b) the title insurance producer is appointed by a title insurer autiiuuzcu iu do business
in the state;
(c) one or more of the following is to be issued as part of the transaction:
(i) an owner's policy of title insurance; or
(ii) a lender's policy of title insurance;
(d) (i) all funds deposited with the title insurance producer in connection with any
escrow:
(A) are deposited:
(I) in a federally insured financial institution; and
(II) in a trust account that is separate from all other trust account rlinds that are not
related to real estate transactions; and
(B) are the property of the persons entitled to them under the provisions of the escrow;
and
(ii) are segregated escrow by escrow in the records of the title insurance producer;
(e) earnings on funds held in escrow may be paid out of the escrow account to any
person in accordance with the conditions of the escrow; and
(f) the escrow does not require the title insurance producer to hol^J:
(i) construction funds; or
(ii) funds held for exchange under Section 1031, Internal Revenue Code.

In order to conduct an escrow, a title producer must be properly licensed, be appointed by
an authorized title insurer, and issue one or more title insurance policies.
A split escrow occurs when two of the parties to a real property transaction conduct their
portion of the escrow using two separate title producers. The use of two separate title

producers creates two separate transactions and each separate transaction must comply
with all of the requirements to conduct an escrow.
A split escrow consists of two separate transactions with each transaction
being done by a properly licensed title producer appointed by an
authorized title insurer that issues either an owner's or a lender's title
insurance policy.
A prohibited split escrow occurs if either of the two separate transactions
does not comply with all three of the requirements to conduct an escrow.
A cash only split escrow is prohibited because one of the separate transactions does not
include the issuance of a title policy.
DATED this 14th day of June, 2007

D. Kent Michie
Commissioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C.,
MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,
vs
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
etal,

CASE NO. 070913234
JUDGE SANDRA PEULER

Defendant.

Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on Plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment and Defendant Brighton Title Company's counter-motion for summary judgment.
Based upon a review of the pleadings filed in this matter, the oourt rules as follows.
1. The request for hearing is denied. The Court has reviewed the pleadings filed
in this matter, and oral argument would not be of assistance in ruling.
2. The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. Defendant Deseret Sky
has not responded to Plaintiff's motion. Defendant Brighton Title Company's responsive
memorandum failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Plaintiff's statement of
undisputed facts is uncontroverted, and that there is no genuine issue of material fact in
dispute. Additionally, based upon the memoranda filed, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to judgment against both defendants, jointly and
severally; as to Deseret Sky Development, for the entire amount of liquidated damages and

o

as to Brighton Title Company, for the $100,000 returned to Deseret Sky.
Counsel for Plaintiff is requested to prepare an order consistent with this rul
Dated this

7

da

Y

of

January, 2009

BY THE COURT:

?ANDRA PEULER ft <\ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE";;
/

}

- y^

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

Z5

day of

-=Q g_AK t

NAME
ADAM L CRAYK
Attorney DEF
525 S 300 EAST STE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
SAMANTHA J SLARK
Attorney DEF
50 W BROADWAY STE 700
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
SCOTT R WANGSGARD
Attorney PLA
57 W 200 S STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

20^^ .

Deputy

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C.,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
vs

CASE #070913234
February 19,2009

DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, et al,
Judge Sandra Peuler
Defendant.
I have received and reviewed the briefing on Defendant, Brighton Title Company,
LLC's motion for clarification and reconsideration of the prior ruling on summary judgment.
While I decline to reconsider arguments I fully considered previously, I will clarify my prior
ruling, as follows.
1. Brighton Title's failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 7 was noted, but
that was not the basis for the ruling.
2. Since there were no material issues of fact, the matter was decided on the law.
Brighton Title accepted earnest money in its capacity as the escrow agent for the real
estate transaction between Plaintiff and Defendant Deseret Sky. Pursuant to the terms of
the contract, and the undisputed facts, the money became non-refundable when it was not
timely cancelled or objection made by Deseret Sky. Again, pursuant to the terms of the
contract and the undisputed facts, Brighton Title became obligated to forward the funds to
Metro National Title. Instead, it refunded the money to Deseret Sky, in violation of its
obligation to Plaintiff
While Brighton Title may have been concerned about Plaintiffs ability to obtain title

to the subject property, it was not entitled to make its own determination about the rights
or claims of the respective parties; it was obligated to fulfill its contractual and fiduciary
duties as the escrow agent. (The Court notes that Brighton Title had an option of paying
the funds into the Court, and allowing the other parties to litigate the issues, but chose not
to do so.)
The Bulletin referenced by Brighton Title does not have the force of law, and cannot
be used to excuse Brighton Title's failure to perform. Pursuant to the undisputed facts,
the real estate purchase contract did not violate any provision of Utah law.
Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties, when it agreed
to hold the funds as escrow agent.

Refunding the money to Deseret Sky violated its

duties, causing damage to Plaintiff in the amount of the escrowed funds.
I have received an Amended Notice to Submit, filed by Plaintiff, relative to the form
of the Judgment, as well as to the issue of attorneys fees. Since I have issued this
clarification to the earlier minute entry, I ask both counsel to reyiew the proposed Judgment
and determine if there may be an agreement as to the form. If not, Plaintiff is requested
to provide the Court with a courtesy copy of the Judgment, so that the pleadings filed in
connection with the objection may be reviewed in substance.
This Minute Entry is the Order of the Court, and no additional Order is required to
be prepared on this clarification.
Dated this

t^

BY THE COURT:

day of February, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s ^>liS day of

r&ll

NAME
ADAM L CRAYK
Attorney DEF
525 S 300 EAST STE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
SAMANTHA J SLARK
Attorney DEF
5 0 W BROADWAY STE 70 0
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
SCOTT R WANGSGARD
Attorney PLA
57 W 200 S STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
2 0 Q °\
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Deputy Court (?l'erk \

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C.,
MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,
vs

CASE #070913234
February 20, 2009

DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, et al,
Judge Sandra Peuler
Defendant.

Before the Court is an Amended Notice to Submit'for Decision on Defendant
Brighton Title Company, LLC's Objection to Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs. Based
upon a review of the pleadings, the Court rules as stated herein.
The Plaintiffs Complaint, on which summary judgment was granted, sought an
award of attorneys fees, based upon the contract enterecji into between Plaintiff and
Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLC. The only Defendant liable for fees is Deseret
Sky, pursuant to the contract. Since that Defendant did not contest the summary judgment
motion, no ruling was necessary on the issue of attorneys f^es.
Defendant Brighton Title lacks standing to contest the attorneys fees awarded
against Deseret Sky. Therefore, its objection is denied. Neither Defendant has objected
to the requested costs.
The Amended Notice to Submit also seeks a ruling oh Brighton Title's Objection to
Plaintiffs draft of ruling. Since the Court clarified the bases for its ruling on summary
judgment, and requested counsel to make a further determination as to whether they can

-2agree on the form of the order, the Court will await that determination Upon
notice by either counsel that they are not able to agree, the Court will address that issue
The Court notes that the Plaintiffs previously-prepared proposed Ruling and Judgment
have been received
This Minute Entry will stand as the Order of the Court, and no additional order is
required to be prepared on this issue.
Dated this

*ZO

day of February, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this (y[f)

day of

\~(P.AK

NAME
ADAM L CRAYK
Attorney DEF
525 S 300 EAST STE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
SAMANTHA J SLARK
Attorney DEF
50 W BROADWAY STE 70 0
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
SCOTT R WANGSGARD
Attorney PLA
57 W 200 S STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
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K

ML

Deputy Court (6lerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C.,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE #070913234
March 16, 2009

vs
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
et al,

Judge Sandra Peuler

Defendant.

I have received and reviewed the Plaintiff's proposed Ruling, as well as the
proposed Judgment. I have also reviewed the Defendant, Brighton Title Company, LLC's
Second Objection to Ruling, filed March 6, 2009. The objection is based upon the minute
entry dated February 19, 2009, which clarified the earlier summary judgment ruling. The
Plaintiff's proposed Ruling sets forth, in substantial detail, the undisputed facts upon which
the Court relied, as well as the legal bases for the granting of summary judgment to
Plaintiff. Though it was not requested by the Court, it is accurate and consistent with the
Court's ruling. Therefore, I have signed it, as well as the proposed Judgment, on this date.
Dated this

/ (f

day of March, 2009

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070913234 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL:
MAIL:
84101

ADAM L CRAYK 525 S 300 EAST STE 200 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
SAMANTHA J SLARK 50 W BROADWAY STE 700 SALT LAKE CITY UT

MAIL:
84101

SCOTT R WANGSGARD 57 W 2 00 S STE 4 00 SALT LAKE CITY

Date:

JT^r-cJn

)U

WjQ

(XtWt

Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)

UT

FILED DISTRICT C0OBT
Third Judicial District
S.R.WANGSGARD, LC
Scott R. Wangsgard, #3376
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 578-3510
Facsimile: (801)578-3531
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation,

vs.

;
])
)
;)
)
]>

DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
a Utah limited liability company;
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; and
Does 1-10,

;
])
;
])
;

Defendants.

]

Plaintiff,

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANT BRIGHTON TITLE
COMPANY'S COUNTERMOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 070913234
Judge Peuler

Plaintiff Cooper Enterprises, P.C.'s ("Cooper Enterprises") Motion for Summary Judgment
and Brighton Title Company, LLC's ("Brighton Title") Countermotion for Summary Judgment
having been submitted for decision by Plaintiffs Notice to Submit for Decision, dated December 8,
2008. The Court reviewed all of the pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, discovery responses
and deposition excerpts submitted in conjunction therewith. The Court carefully reviewed the law
applicable to the various positions of the parties, and having determined that there is no genuine
issue of material fact in dispute respecting this matter, and that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, as more fully set forth hereinafter, the Court hereby enters this Ruling on Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment and on Brighton Title's Countermotion for Summary Judgment as
follows:
OVERVIEW
Deseret Sky Development, LLC ("Deseret Sky") did not file an opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment. Brighton Title's response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment did not contain "a verbatim restatement of each of the moving parties facts that is
I
controverted" as provided by Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Brighton Title
has admitted in a Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's Minute Entry Granting
Summary Judgment, filed with the Court, dated January 13, 2009, that Plaintiffs statements of
undisputed facts are uncontro verted. The Court further determined under Rule 7(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, that the issues raised in this matter have been authoritatively decided, and that oral
argument would not be of assistance in the Court making its ruling on this matter.
This matter involves the claims of Cooper Enterprises, as Sellers, against Deseret Sky, as
Purchaser, and Brighton Title, as escrow holder, respecting claims for liquidated damages as
provided in a Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land ("REPC"). The purchase price for the land
which is the subject matter hereof was $7,500,000.00, with an initial $100,000.00 in earnest money
to be deposited with Brighton Title. An additional $100,000.00 in earnest money was also due from
Deseret Sky at expiration of the diligence period. All of the earnest money was to become nonrefundable and delivered to Cooper Enterprises unless the contract wa$ cancelled or objection made
regarding Deseret Sky's diligence investigations.
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Neither objection nor cancellation was provided by Deseret Sky to Cooper Enterprises within
the diligence period provided by the terms of the REPC. Nevertheless, contrary to the terms of the
REPC, after the expiration of the diligence period, Brighton Title returned to Deseret Sky the initial
$100,000.00 earnest money deposit it was holding in escrow.
Cooper Enterprises claims that Deseret Sky is liable to it in the principal amount of
$200,000.00, representing the initial earnest money deposit of $100,000.00, plus the additional
deposit required by the REPC of $100,000.00, for a total of $200,000.00, and that Brighton Title is
liable to Cooper Enterprises in the amount of $100,000.00 for misapplying the earnest monies
deposited with it into escrow.
Deseret Sky has failed to respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, but
essentially contends in its Answer and Counterclaim that it is not liable, even though it did not
properly object or terminate the contract timely, because Cooper Enterprises did not hold fee title to
the property at the time the REPC was entered into. However, Cooper Enterprises was under
contract to purchase the real property from W.H. Hansen Investments, LC (the "Hansen Contract")
and could, thereafter, transfer title to Deseret Sky.
Brighton Title claims it is not liable to Cooper Enterprises was not the fee title holder of the
property, and because the form of the transaction was prohibited by bulletins issued by the Insurance
Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department. The bulletins relied on by Brighton Title are
advisory in nature and do not have any legal effect and do not relieve Brighton Title of its obligations
as escrow agent under the REPC.

3

UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following undisputed material facts are established by the motions, pleadings, supporting
memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, discovery responses, deposition excerpts and other matters
submitted to the Court respecting this matter.
Cooper Enterprises is a Utah professional corporation in good standing, doing business in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Deseret Sky is a Utah limited liability company in good standing, doing business in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
Brighton Title is a Utah limited Liability company in good standing, doing business in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
The real property which is the subject hereof is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and known generally as Danish Heights Estates PUD or 2745 East Creek Road, Cottonwood Heights,
Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Real Property").
By Real Estate Purchase Contract for Land, with offer reference date of May 25, 2007, as
modified by Addendum Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (the "REPC"), Cooper Enterprises agreed to sell, and
Deseret Sky agreed to buy the Real Property.
At the time the REPC was entered into, Cooper Enterprises had a contractual right to
purchase the Real Property by virtue of the Hansen Contract.
Angela Gowans was at all relevant times a real estate agent employed by Great American
Properties, whose principal broker is Wes Williams.
At all relevant times, Angela Gowans was Deseret Sky's agent for purposes of the REPC.
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On May 27, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper Enterprises a conditional use
application, preliminary plat submittal which included all applications, title materials, and
geotechnical information, drawings and engineering information, along with the Cottonwood Heights
Preliminary Plat Approval, Application Acceptance Letter, Fencing Proposal, Permit Report,
correspondence with Cottonwood Heights City, sellers disclosures, and minutes from the
Cottonwood Heights Improvement District pertaining to the Real Property also known as Danish
Heights project.
On or about June 1, 2007, Ms. Gowans received from Cooper Enterprises the Hansen
Contract (showing Cooper Enterprises' contract interest for purchase of the Real Property).
Angela Gowans had "a dozen" conversations with Deseret Sky representatives and
representatives of Brighton Title in subsequent days respecting the subject of the materials Cooper
Enterprises provided and the fact that Cooper Enterprises, P.C. did not hold fee title to the Real
Property.
Additionally, on May 31, 2007, Brighton Title was aware that Cooper Enterprises did not
hold fee title to the Real Property.
The next day, June 1, 2007, Brighton Title so informed Deseret Sky.
The REPC, paragraph 2(a) reflected an initial earnest money deposit of One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), and provided: 'THIS DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY
NON-REFUNDABLE".
Paragraph 2 of Addendum No. 1 to the REPC provided:

2)
Earnest Money to be $100,000 deposited w/ Brighton Title Company
upon acceptance. An additional $100,000 earnest money to be deposited with
Brighton Title Company after Buyer's Due Diligence deadline. Total of $200,000
shall [be] non-refundable after June 8. 2007.
Addendum No. 2 to the REPC provides:
1.
REPC, Section 2(d) $ 100,000 additional earnest money due on June 8,
2007 by 5:00 PMMDT...
* * *

6. [sic] $100,000 Earnest Money to be non-refundable but applicable and
immediately released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MDT.
6.
An additional $100,000 Earnest Money will be deposited on June 8,
2007 by 5:00 pm MDT which is non-refundable but applicable and immediately
released to Seller on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MDT.
Addendum No. 3 provides:
4)
All earnest monies shall be deposited with Brighton Title initially and
shall be released to Metro National Title on June 8, 2007 at 5:00 pm MST.
Under the terms of the REPC, $ 100,000 was deposited with Brighton Title, as evidenced by letter of
receipt by Brighton Title ("Letter Receipt"), dated June 5, 2007, over the signature of Jeff Gorringe.
Brighton Title accepted the initial $ 100,000 earnest money frdm Deseret Sky in escrow, in its
capacity as an escrow agent under the REPC.
Paragraph 8 of the REPC provides:
8.
BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON BUYER'S DUE
DILIGENCE. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this Contract (check applicable
boxes):
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval'of the content of all the
Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7;
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical cpndition
inspection of the Property;
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(c) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the
Property by a licensed surveyor;
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of applicable federal,
state and local governmental laws, ordinances and regulations affecting the Property;
and any applicable deed restrictions and/or CC&R's (covenants, conditions and
restrictions) affecting the Property;
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon the Property appraising for not less than
the Purchase Price;
(f) [Xj IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the terms and
conditions of any mortgage financing referenced in Section 2 above;
(g) [X| IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests
and evaluations of the Property: (specify) Any additional deemed necessary by
Buyer.
If any of items 8(a) through 8(g) are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1,
8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. The items checked in the
affirmative above are collectively referred to as Buyer's "Due Diligence.". . .
Paragraph 8.1 of the REPC provides:
Due Diligence Deadline. No later than the Due Diligence Deadline referenced in
Section 24(b) Buyer shall: (a) complete all of Buyer's Due Diligence; and
(b) determine if the results of Buyer's Due Diligence are acceptable to Buyer.
In accordance with the REPC, the earnest monies ($200,000 total) become non-refundable on
June 8, 2007, unless the REPC was timely cancelled by Deseret Sky. In that regard, the REPC
provides:
8.2
Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the results of
Buyer's Due Diligence are unacceptable, Buyer may, no later than the Due Diligence
Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide
Seller with written notice of objections.
8.3
Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence
Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or
(b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, the
Buyer's Due Diligence shall be deemed approved by Buyer and the contingencies
referenced in Sections 8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing
contingency, shall be deemed waived by Buyer.
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Paragraph 24 of the REPC provided for a Due Diligence Deadline of June 8, 2007.
The REPC provides, in paragraph 16:
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect to . . . retain the
Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. . . .
The REPC provides, in paragraph 17:
17. ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. In the event of litigation . . . to
enforce this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable
attorneys fees. . . .
The earnest money for the transaction at issue was on deposit with Brighton Title on June 5,
2007, despite the fact that since on or about May 27, 2007, and at the latest June 1, 2007, Deseret
Sky and Brighton Title knew that Cooper wasn't the holder of fee title to the property.
Deseret Sky neither canceled the REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a
written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence
Deadline.
Brighton Title was to receive an additional $100,000 by the end of Deseret Sky's Diligence
Period, if the REPC wasn't cancelled or objected to by that date.
The June 8,2007 Due Diligence Deadline came and went without Deseret Sky depositing an
additional $100,000.00.
On June 11,2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter (back-dated to June 8,2007) to Robert Cooper of
Cooper Enterprises ostensibly terminating the REPC and instructing Brighton Title "to return all
earnest money deposits to the Buyer."

On June 12 of 2007 (four days after expiration of the diligence period, without cancellation or
objection by Deseret Sky), Jeff Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Cooper Enterprises that
Brighton Title was going to release the earnest money deposit back to Deseret Sky even though
Brighton Title was informed that Cooper Enterprises claimed the money.
By letter dated June 13, 2007, Wayne Gorringe of Brighton Title informed Deseret Sky:
a. that the $ 100,000 Brighton Title held in escrow were being returned to Deseret Sky;
b. that (despite the Diligence Period under REPC having expired five days prior (i.e.,
June 8, 2007), Brighton Title held out hope of "completing] this transaction."
None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro National Title, but was instead
released back to Deseret Sky even though Brighton Title was aware of Cooper Enterprises' claim to
the deposit.
Even after the RECP June 8, 2007 Diligence Period had expired, Deseret Sky was still in
discussions with Cooper Enterprises concerning the potential of having a new contract for the
property. These discussions continued for almost a month and a half after the Diligence Period
expired.
As a result of Deseret Sky's default of its obligations under the REPC, no sale was
transacted and Cooper Enterprises was unable to purchase the Real Property under the Hansen
Contract, causing Cooper Enterprises to suffer an actual loss of $1,034,666.66 profit and to forfeit
the $100,000 that Cooper Enterprises had deposited in accordance with the Hansen Contract to
acquire the Real Property (which would then, in turn, be sold and conveyed to Deseret Sky).

Cooper Enterprises elected to accept the earnest money as liquidated damages for Deseret
Sky's default.
Cooper Enterprises made demand on Deseret Sky for payment of $200,000 as earnest money
deposit, and liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Deseret Sky has failed and
refused to pay.
Cooper Enterprises made demand on Brighton Title for payment of the $100,000 initial
earnest money deposit, as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC, which Brighton Title has
failed and refused to pay.
Cooper Enterprises has retained the services of an attorney to eniorce its rights and is entitled
to an award of the attorney's fees and costs pursuant to paragraph 17 of the REPC.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Standards governing the granting of summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law {Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred, 182 P.3d
337 (Utah 2008) (citing Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P.). As required by iaw, the court has viewed all
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but has not assumed facts for
which no evidence is offered. Id. (citingPeterson v. Coca-Cola USA\ 9.002 UT 42, ^ 20,48 P.3d 941
(Utah 2002)).
Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly before the court are to be
construed in favor of the opponent on a motion of summary judgmerit, the mere existence of issues
of fact does not preclude summary judgment. The issues of fact must be material to the applicable
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rule of law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) {citing Morgan v Industrial Design
Corp., 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982) (mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole
does not preclude entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the
case); Heglar Ranch, Inc v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980) (summary judgment not precluded
simply whenever some fact remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely
controverted); see also F. M A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 404 P.2d 670 (Utah 1965) (mere
dispute as to some question of fact does not preclude granting of summary judgment, as issue in
dispute must be one which is material in the sense that resolving it is necessary to determine legal
rights of parties).
As noted above, Deseret Sky has wholly failed to respond to Cooper Enterprises' Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Brighton Title has admitted that each of Plaintiffs facts that ]s
uncontroverted. Thus, the facts as stated by Plaintiff Cooper Enterprises in its Motion for Summaiy
Judgment are deemed admitted.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court has carefully reviewed all of the materials and
pleadings submitted by the parties in this matter in making its ruling.
The undisputed, material facts of the instant case show that Plaintiff is entitled to summaiy
judgment against the Defendants as a matter of law.
Seller need not have title at all times during the executory period of a contract
Deseret Sky, in its answer and counterclaim, and Brighton Title contend that they are not
liable to Cooper Enterprises because Cooper Enterprises misrepresented itself as the owner of the
Real Property because Cooper Enterprises did not hold fee title to the Real Property when the parties
entered into the REPC. Defendants' contention is demonstrably erroneous.

Prior to the parties entering into the REPC, Cooper Enterprises was under contract with WH
Hansen Investments, LC to purchase the Real Property and, therefore, held equitable title to the Real
Property. Significantly, Deseret Sky and Brighton Title were on notice of this fact before the initial
earnest money $100,000.00 was deposited with Brighton Title, and well before June 8,2007, which
date was Deseret Sky's Due Diligence Deadline.
Equitable title is, by definition, "a title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and that
gives the holder the right to acquire formal legal title." (Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).)
Cooper Enterprises thus held equitable title to the property at the time it entered into the REPC with
Deseret Sky.

Cooper Enterprises correctly claimed—and represented itself as holding—an

ownership interest in the Real Property; moreover, Deseret Sky and Brighton Title had actual notice
of the nature of Cooper's title before the initial deposit was acknowledged, and before expiration of
the Due Diligence Deadline.
Brighton Title and Deseret Sky's actual knowledge of Cooper's equitable title status
notwithstanding, Deseret Sky contends in its answer and counterclaim that Cooper Enterprises'
failure to disclose its lack of fee title at the time the REPC was entered into constituted a fraud which
entitled Deseret Sky to rescind the REPC. Brighton Title contends the REPC was unenforceable and
it was, therefore, entitled to refund to Deseret Sky the earnest money. This very issue was expressly
addressed in the Utah Supreme Court case of Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d 1195 (Utah, 1981). The
Neves court held that a seller under a uniform real estate contract that represents itself as having title
need not have marketable title until final payment is made or tendered. The Neves court further
observed, inter alia:

[As early as 1909, in Foxley v. Rich, 35 Utah 162, 99 P. 666 (1909) the Utah
Supreme Court] established the fundamental rule that a seller need not have legal
title during the entire executory period of a real estate contract.
Neves v. Wright, 638 P.2d at 1197.
In Owens v. Neymeyer, 62 Utah 580, 221 P. 160 (1923), the seller, at the time the
contract was entered into, did not have legal title to the land. His cousin, who had a
claim against the land for $1,277.75 as part of the seller's purchase price, held legal
title. About the time an action was commenced by the buyer, the seller's cousin
conveyed legal title to the seller, enabling him to convey good title prior to the time
established in the contract. The Court held that the purchaser was not entitled to
rescission and recovery of the purchase price.
Id. at 1198 (citing Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973); Woodard v.
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953)).
The court in Neves continued:
This Court reiterated the basic principle in Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 223,
357 P.2d 190, 192-93 (1960):
[T]he vendor in a real estate contract is generally not obliged to have
full and clear marketable title at all times during the pendency of his
contract of sale because, ordinarily, title need not be conveyed until
the final payment is made or tendered; and we further agree that the
purchaser cannot use a claimed deficiency in title as an excuse for
refusing to keep a commitment to purchase property, as was
attempted in the case of Woodard v. Allen, (1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d
398 (1953).) (Footnotes omitted.)
Id.
The Neves court went on to explain:
The rule that a seller of real estate need not have title at all times during the
executory period of a contract, is not designed to favor sellers over buyers; rather,
the purpose is to enhance the alienability of real estate by providing necessary
flexibility in real estate transactions.
* * *

The basic test in determining whether a buyer can rescind is whether the defect, by
its nature, is one that can be removed, as a practical matter, as distinguished from

defects which, by their nature, cannot be removed by the seller as a practical matter.
Davis v. Dean Vincent Inc., 255 Or. 233, 465 P.2d 702 (1970).
Id. at 1199.
Deseret Sky was fully advised of Cooper's interest in the Real Property during the Diligence
Period and still did not cancel or object as allowed by the REPC. Deseret Sky was provided a title
commitment showing Cooper as purchaser, and also was given a copy of the Hansen Contract. Well
before the expiration of the Diligence Period, Deseret Sky knew that title would pass from W. H.
Hansen to Cooper, and then to Deseret Sky.
Deseret Sky has waived any potential breach of contract claim against Cooper
Even if any of Cooper's disclosures were considered somehow to constitute
misrepresentations, Deseret Sky cannot claim such as a defense to its breach of contact, nor claim
breach of contract on the part of Cooper:
[I]f the party to whom a misrepresentation has been made, after having ascertained
the real facts of the case, and thus discovered the untruth of the statements, goes on
acting in pursuance of the contract, . . . he thereby waives the benefit of the
misrepresentations, and cannot allege them as a ground either for rescinding or
resisting enforcement of the agreement. In other words, the party who has been
misled is required, as soon as he learns the truth and discovers the falsity of the
statements on which he relied, with all reasonable diligence to disaffirm the contract,
and give the other party an opportunity of rescinding it, and of restoring both of them
to their original position. The party deceived is not allowed to go on deriving all
possible benefit from the transaction, and then claim to be relieved from his own
obligations by a rescission or a refusal to execute.
Le Vine v. Whitehouse, 109 P. 2, 7 (Utah 1910).
Accordingly, Deseret Sky's and Brighton Title's defense to Cooper Enterprises' claims (for
liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC) based upon a lack of title and/or other
misrepresentation is without merit as a matter of law. By the same token, the Le Vine v. Whitehouse

holding (and the Kenny v. Rich holding cited in the next paragraph infra) dictates that Defendants
cannot assert against Cooper a claim for breach of contract that Deseret Sky itself has, by its inaction,
waived.
Deseret Sky's failure to elect to cancel the REPC before the Due Diligence Deadline
Deseret Sky neither canceled the REPC by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a
written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence by the June 8, 2007 Due Diligence
Deadline. Paragraph 8.3 of the REPC prescribes the consequence of Deseret Sky's inaction:
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Due Diligence Deadline, Buyer
does not: (a) cancel this Contract as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written
objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's Due Diligence, The Buyer's Due Diligence
shall be deemed approved by Buyer; and the contingencies referenced in Sections
8(a) through 8(g), including but not limited to, any financing contingency, shall be
deemed waived by Buyer.
(Emphasis added.)
The guiding legal principles with respect to Deseret Sky's failure to timely cancel or object were
recently discussed by the Utah Court of Appeals in Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008).
In discussing this principle, the Court of Appeals stated:
Where a party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and timeline in
order to invoke specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the party
waives his or her rights. See Brinton v IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 966 (Utah
1998) ("[T]he trial court correctly required [the party] to timely assert each objection
to purported . . . violations of the [contract], in compliance with his contractually
assumed duty, or relinquish them [as waived]."); see also DCM Inv. Corp. v.
Pinecrest Inv. Co , 34 P.3d 785 (Utah 2001) ("[Defendants] failure to choose either
option [as required by the contract] resulted in waiver of its contractual right to select
an option."); American Rural Cellular v. Systems Commc 'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185,193
(Utah App. 1997).
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. In re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589, 599
(Utah 2003) (citing Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 P.2d 92, 98 (Utah App.1994). "Waiver of a

contractual right occurs when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its
contractual rights." "[The relinquishment] must be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied." Id The procedures set out for cancellation or objection set forth in the REPC are clear
and unequivocal. Deseret Sky had until June 8, 2007, to exercise its rights to object and/or cancel
the REPC. Having failed to do so, Deseret Sky relinquished and waived its right to rescind the
REPC. Deseret Sky is now barred from belatedly claiming either a right of rescission or a claim of
breach against Cooper.
Because Deseret Sky did not timely cancel the transaction, in accordance with the terms of
the REPC, the earnest monies ($200,000 total) have become non-refundable and payable to Cooper
Enterprises as liquidated damages.
Deseret Sky has waived any right to rescind based on a theory of fraud
As of the June 8,2007 Due Diligence Deadline Deseret Sky had neither canceled the REPC
by providing written notice to Seller nor delivered a written objection to Seller regarding the Buyer's
Due Diligence. Nevertheless, for more than a month and a half after the Diligence Deadline, Deseret
Sky continued to communicate with Cooper in the hope it might still consummate a sale of the Real
Property. At no time during these continued contacts and discussions did Deseret Sky either assert to
Cooper Enterprises that it was defrauded or that it claimed a right of cancellation based upon any
misrepresentation.
It is well settled by decisions from [the Utah Supreme Court] court that a person
claiming the right to rescind a contract because of misrepresentations or fraud, must,
after discovery of the fraud, announce his purpose [to rescind] anc} adhere to it.
Frailey v. McGarry, 211 P.2d 840, 844 (Utah 1949) (citing Taylor v. Moore, 87 Utah
493,51 P.2d222).

Deseret Sky cannot claim on the one hand that it was defrauded, yet having discovered the
ostensible misrepresentation, continue under such circumstances to pursue an interest in the REPC.
If it considered itself defrauded, Deseret Sky's right was to cancel or object. Deseret Sky did neither,
and it cannot now belatedly claim the right to rescind. Consequently, Deseret Sky's defense to
Cooper Enterprises' claims and Deseret Sky's counterclaim on the basis of "'fraud'* is without merit
as a matter of law.
Deseret Sky's default
Under the terms of the REPC, Deseret Sky made an initial $100,000 earnest money deposit
with Brighton Title, as evidenced by the "Letter of receipt" by Brighton Title, dated June 5, 2007,
over the signature of Jeff Gorringe. Deseret Sky never made the second $100,000 earnest money
deposit and is thus in default of the REPC, making it liable to Cooper for liquidated damages of
$200,000. Additionally and tellingly, on June 11,2007, Deseret Sky sent a letter (back-dated to June
8, 2007) via facsimile to Robert Cooper, one of the principals of Cooper Enterprises, whereby
Deseret Sky advised Cooper Enterprises that it was cancelling the contract in accordance with
Section 8.2 of the REPC. This back-dated letter makes clear that Deseret Sky was aware that if it
wished to cancel the contract, it must have done so prior to close of business on June 8, 2007.
Deseret Sky has breached the contract in two distinct ways: (1) by failing to make the second
$100,000 Earnesl Money Deposit, and (2) by repudiating its obligations under the contract in writing,
with a bogus back-dated cancellation letter.
Liquidated damages
Where the parties to a contract stipulate to the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid
in case of a breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount stipulated is not

disproportionate to the damages actually sustained Perkins v Spencer, 243 P 2d 446, 449 (Utah
1952) (citing Bramwell Inv Co v Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P 2d 913, 916) In the instant case the
amount of forfeiture involved is $200,000 on a contract of $7,500,000, from which Cooper
Enterprises would have profited in the amount of approximately $1,000,000

In fact, Cooper

Enterprises ended up losing not only its expected profit, but forfeited to its Seller, W H Hansen, a
$100,000 earnest money deposit of its own, thus the liquidated damages are not greatly
disproportionate to the actual damage and much less than actually suffered by Cooper Enterprises
See Reliance Ins Co v Utah Dept of Transp , 858 P 2d 1363, 1367 (Utah 1993)
On the issue of liquidated damages, Brighton Title appears to argue that Cooper Enterprises
cannot claim liquidated damages because its damages "aie not difficult to calculate," in light of
"Cooper's calculation of the damages to the very last dollar " Oddly, Brighton's argument is that
because Cooper Enterprises' actual damages indisputably exceeded the liquidated damages provided
in the REPC, Cooper Enterprises is somehow barred from electing to claim liquidated damages As
a matter of contractual right, Cooper Enterprises was entitled to the earnest money as liquidated
damages upon its election following breach of the REPC l There is no authority for the proposition
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A provision for liquidated damages is generally enforceable, the same as the other terms of a contract, [unless] the
damages thus stipulated are so excessive that they bear no reasonable relationship to the actual damages suffered, [in
which case] it would be unconscionable to give it effect, [and] the court will regard it as a penalty and refuse to enforce it
Young Elec Sign Co v Vetas, 564 P 2d 758, 760 (Utah, 1977), Foote v Taylor, 635 P 2d 46 49 (Utah, 1981) (If a
provision in a contract provides for liquidated damages which are so grossly excessive in comparison to actual damage
suffered that it is unconscionable, the court will not enforce it), Andreasen v Hansen, 335 P 2d 404,407 (Utah, 1959) (It
is true that provisions for 'stipulated' or 'liquidated7 damages in cases of breach of contract have sometimes prescribed
forfeiture of amounts so grossly disproportionate to any actual damage that to enforce the provision would shock the
conscience In such instances, the courts, invoking their powers of equity, refuse to enforce such penalties In that
connection however, it is to be kept firmly m mmd, that the courts recognize the rights of parties freely to contract and
are extremely reluctant to do anything which will fail to give full recognition to such nghts), Robbins v Finlay, 645 P 2d
623,625 - 26 (Utah, 1982) (Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable if designed to provide fair compensation for
a breach based on a reasonable relation to actual damages (citing Young Electric Sign Co v Vetas, Utah, 564 P 2d 758,
760(1977))

that a plaintiff must forego liquidated damages when damages are "easily calculated" after the fact
and actual damages exceed the liquidated damages provision of the breached contract.
Brighton Title's liability for failure to uphold its duties as escrow agent
Upon the performance of the condition or the happening of the event stipulated in the escrow
agreement, it is the duty of the depositary to deliver what is deposited in the escrow, and the
depositary, being as much the agent of the grantor as of the grantee, is as much bound to deliver on
the performance of the specified condition or the happening of the specified event as he or she is
bound to withhold until the performance or the happening of the event (see, e g , 28 Am. Jur. 2d
Escrow § 28).
Brighton Title accepted the initial $ 100,000 earnest money from Deseret Sky in escrow, in its
capacity as an escrow agent. Brighton Title was to receive $200,000 by the end of Deseret Sky's
Diligence Period, if the contract wasn't cancelled or objected to by that date. At the end of the
Diligence Period, if the contract wasn't cancelled or objected to, the earnest money was to be
forwarded to Metro National Title. None of the earnest money was ever forwarded to Metro
National Title, but was instead released back to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title disbursed the initial
$100,000 earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky in default of its obligations to Cooper Enterprises.
Section 7-22-108 of the Utah Code provides for an escrow agent's duties as follows:
(2) All other assets or property received by an escrow agent in accordance
with an escrow agreement shall be maintained in a manner which will reasonably
preserve and protect the property from loss, theft, or damage, and which will
otherwise comply with all duties and responsibilities of a fiduciary or bailee
generally.
Brighton Title accepted the earnest money and agreed to serve as the escrow agent for the REPC
transaction Rriahton Title chose to act as it did. When there are conflicting claims to the fund held

by the escrow agent, the agent is neither required nor permitted to make its own determination as to
the rights of the rival claimants, but may rely upon any applicable contractual provisions in refusing
to deliver the documents to either party and cannot be held liable for exercising its right to refuse
delivery, or can seek a judicial determination by interpleader of the entitlement of the parties. 28
Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 28.
When the Diligence Period expired without objection or cancellation, Brighton Title had
three rightful options with respect to the disposition of the earnest money that it held on deposit.
First, hold the money pending an agreement between the parties to the REPC; second, to forward the
money on to Metro National Title, as required by the terms of the REPC; or third, interplead the
funds, as allowed by Rule 22, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, Brighton Title chose a fourth
path of wrongfully returning the initial earnest money deposit to Deseret Sky. Brighton Title is thus
liable to Cooper Enterprises for the amount of the initial deposit.
Brighton Title's liability is established by black letter law: 'Title companies will be liable for
improper disbursement of funds they hold in escrow" (2 Title Insurance Law § 20:7. Title companies'
duties as escrow and closing agents—handling funds).
It is well established that an escrow agent assumes the role of the agent of both
parties to the transaction, and as such, a fiduciary is held to a high standard of care in
dealing with its principals.
Freegardv. First WesternNat. Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987) (citing National Bank v. Equity
Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886, 910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973)2; see also Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252,
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See Schoepe v. Zions First National Bank, 750 F.Supp. 1084, at 1086-87 and n.4 CD. Utah 1990), where it discussed
''Utah Case Law on Escrow Agency":
In reversing the trial court in Freegard v First Western Nafl Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
concluded that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action against the escrow agent based upon the fiduciary duty
20

257, 112 P.2d 153, 155; cert. denied,3\4 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 361, 86 L.Ed. 472 (1941); see also 28
Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 26. Depositary is a fiduciary)). Deviation from those terms without the mutual
consent of the parties concerned will subject the agent to liability for damages caused by his
departure. Miller v. Craig, 558 P.2d 984 (Ariz. App. 1976).3
Bulletin issued by the Utah Department of Insurance does not have the force of law
Brighton Title argues that the transaction contemplated by the REPC was illegal and thus
void. In support of this contention, however, Brighton Title cites to no binding law that the REPC
allegedly violated, and Brighton Title's argument that the REPC violated "the law" as stated in a
Utah State Department of Insurance "Bulletin 2007-1" (pertaining to prohibit so-called "flip
transactions") is an erroneous conclusion based upon a false premise. Brighton Title itself correctly
stops short of claiming that Bulletin 2007-1 has the force of law because (as is shown infra) Bulletin
2007-1 does not. Brighton Title correctly states, "Admittedly, the Bulletin [2007-1] is interpretative

the agent owed to its principal. In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court cited with approval National Bank v. Equity
Investors, 81 Wash.2d 886,910, 506 P.2d 20, 35 (1973). National Bank held that an escrow agent's duties are defined by
the escrow instructions and that the agent becomes liable to its principals for damage resulting from breach of the
instructions or from exceeding authority conferred by the instructions. See 506 P.2d at 35:
An escrow holder is an agent. Whether he be designated escrow agent or escrow holder, or both,
makes little difference in law; the important thing is that as an agent, holder, or trustee for the parties,
he occupies a fiduciary relationship to all parties to the escrow. As an agent, trustee or holder, the
escrow holder owes a fiduciary duty to his principals in the same way that all agents are held to such
standards.
J

See also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 46. Actions at law; election of remedies:
In addition to equitable remedies, actions at law are maintainable for money damages against the
depositary when he or she fails to comply with the agreement or breaches his or her duties thereunder,
as by refusing to deliver the escrowed item as required by the agreement. Id.

30A C.J.S. Escrows § 18. Liabilities. A depositary is liable for a breach of the duties assumed by him or her under the
terms of the escrow contract. If the depositary deviates from the terms of the escrow agreement without the mutual
consent of the parties concerned, violates duties assumed under the terms of the escrow contract or instructions, or
breaches fiduciary duties the depositary is liable in damages for the loss suffered thereby.

and therefore this Court need not give deference to the interpretation set forth in Bulletin 2007-1 "
To issue a mandatory or enforceable "rule", the Utah Department of Insurance must comply with
particular processes prescribed by statute. See, generally, §§31A-2-101, e/seg. and §§63-46a-l, et
seq. (renumbered by Laws 2008 and now appearing at §§63G-3-101, et seq.).
The Affidavit of Richard Peter Stevens, attorney and former Assistant Commissioner of the
Utah Department of Insurance, in paragraph 6 (filed as Exhibit "H" to Brighton Title's Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment) makes clear that these "Bulletins do not
have the force of law and cannot be violated per se". Thus, unless Brighton Title can show a
violation of the underlying statute, § 31 A-23a-406, Utah Code Ann., which the bulletin attempts to
interpret, there is no legal basis to its claim.
Otherwise stated, any argument that Bulletin 2007-1 carries the force of law is patently
erroneous. Notwithstanding that Brighton Title cannot claim the REPC "violated" the non-law that
is Bulletin 2007-1, Brighton Title nevertheless gratuitously concludes, without analysis, that Bulletin
2007-1 "recognized the transaction as a violation of Utah's good funds statute," but this argument
too is patently erroneous.
When Brighton Title's Rule 30(b)(6) witness, Jeffrey Gorringe, was specifically examined
concerning whether or not the transaction contemplated in this matter violated any provision of the
so-called good funds statute, he responded as follows:
Q.
So, every one of those requirements was met in this transaction. There's
nothing in this—these sections that prohibit this transaction. Right?
A.
Right.
*

*

*

Q.
And Cooper then - within this section, could have simultaneously, upon
receipt of wired funds or cash, distributed that money to Hansen, to pay the Hansen
contract. Correct?

A.

It all could have been done the same day?
It all could have been done simultaneously.
*

*

*

Q.
Is there anything that you see in the Code sections that are cited here [§31A23a-406] .. . that would have been violated by the transaction we are talking about
here today.
A.
No.
Brighton's "split escrow" argument that cites to § 31 A-23a-406 and Bulletin 2007-5 is but
another of many red herrings Brighton Title throws in the path of a straightforward analysis. Bulletin
2007-5, like Bulletin 2007-1, is merely interpretive and does not carry the force of law. Moreover,
Bulletin 2007-5, like Bulletin 2007-1, is interpretive of the good funds statute, § 31 A-23a-406, and
as noted above, when Brighton Title's 30(b)(6) witness was questioned regarding whether or not the
facts of this transaction actually violated any of the provisions of the good funds statute, he
responded in the negative. Brighton Title had a contractual and fiduciary duty to both parties
when—and because—it accepted and acted in its capacity as escrow agent. It did not have the
option, much less the "legal" obligation, to violate its contractual duties; instead it should have held
the funds pending an agreement between the parties, interpleaded the escrowed funds or complied
with the contractual terms that governed it.
Cooper Enterprises was entitled to the earnest money as liquidated damages upon its election,
and upon Deseret Sky's breach of the REPC. Regarding the earnest money deposit, Brighton Title
owed to Cooper Enterprises a fiduciary duty as a trustee not to disburse the earnest money deposited
with it, except to fulfill the terms of the individual escrow, in this case the terms of the REPC, for

which the funds were accepted, and not to use the earnest money for any other purpose until all
conditions of the escrow, in this case the REPC, had been met.
CONCLUSION
•

The counter claims of Defendant Deseret Sky must be dismissed; and

•

Defendants owe, and Plaintiff is entitled to, judgment in the principal amount of

$200,000.00, plus interest, from Deseret Sky as liquidated damages under the terms of the REPC,
with Brighton Title to be jointly and severally liable for $100,000 plus interest on such amount.
Interest is calculated at ten percent (10%) per annum from June 9, 2007, until date of judgment in
accordance with § 15-1-1, of the Utah Code Ann., with interest thereafter at the judgment rate of
2.40%. Brighton Title is jointly and severally liable with Deseret Sky for Plaintiff's awardable costs.
Deseret Sky is liable for Plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs in accordance with the terms of the
REPC to be established in accordance with Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dated: jjfltlary Ho , 2009.
BY THE COURT:

4

"When a person acts as the depositary of an escrow, he or she is absolutely bound by the terms and conditions of the
deposit and charged with the strict execution of the duties thereby voluntarily assumed." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Escrow § 24.
"Since the escrow holder has no personal interest in the escrow deposit other than carrying out his or her obligations
under the escrow agreement, he or she must be impartial in his or her dealings with both the depositor and the
beneficiary." Id.
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Steven W. Dougherty
Samantha J. Slark
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Adam L. Crayk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C , a Utah
professional corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
a Utah limited liability company;
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; and
Does 1-10,

;
])
)
;)
]
)
;
])
;
]
;

NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR
DECISION
(Oral Argument Requested)

Civil No. 070913234
Judge Peuler

Defendants.
The following issues are ready for decision by the Court. The documents indicated have
been filed with the Court.
1.

(a)

Type of Motion:

Motion for Summary Judgment and
Request for Hearing

(b)

Date served:

October 20,2008

(c)

Party filing:

Plaintiff

X

Memorandum in Support

X

Affidavits in Support

_X

Memorandum in Opposition

_X

Affidavits in Opposition

_X

Memorandum in Reply
Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

2.

(a)

Type of Motion:

Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment

(b)

Date served:

October 31,2008

(c)

Party

Defendant Brighton Title Company, LLC

filing:

X

Memorandum in Support

X

Affidavits in Support

X

Memorandum in Opposition
Affidavit in Opposition

X

Memorandum in Reply
Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):

3.

Plaintiff requests this matter be set for oral argument.

Dated: December j j

,2008.
S.R. WANGSGARD, LC

Scott R. Wangsgard
Attorneys for Plaintiff

S.R.WANGSGARD, LC
Scott R. Wangsgard, #3376
57 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 578-3510
Facsimile: (801)578-3531
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

COOPER ENTERPRISES, P.C., a Utah
professional corporation,

;
])
)
]

AMENDED NOTICE TO SUBMIT
FOR DECISION

vs.

])

Civil No. 070913234

DESERET SKY DEVELOPMENT, LLC;
a Utah limited liability company;
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY, LLC, a
Utah limited liability company; and
Does 1-10,

;)
]
;
]
;

Judge Penlfir

Plaintiff,

Defendants.
The following issue is ready for decision by the Court. The documents indicated have
been filed with the Court.
1.

(a)

Type of document:

(A) RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT
BRIGHTON TITLE COMPANY'S
COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT; and]
(B) JUDGMENT

(b)

Date served:

January 15,2009

(c)

Party filing:

Plaintiff
Memorandum in Support
Affidavit in Support

_X

Memorandum in Opposition:
(A) Brighton Title's Objection to Plaintiffs Draft of
"Judgment";
(B) Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of
Court's Minute Entry Granting Summary
Judgment;
(C) Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Brighton Title Company, LLC's Motion
for Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's
Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment; and
(D) Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Clarification and Reconsideration of Court's
Minute Entry Granting Summary Judgment
Affidavit in Opposition
Memorandum in Reply

JX

Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify):
(A) Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs;
(B) Objection to Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs;
and
(C) Reply to Objection to Affidavit of Attorneys Fees
and Costs

Dated: January _ 2 3 _ , 2009.
S.R. WANGSGARD, LC

:L.
Scott R^Wangs^urd
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the djil*. ^

°f J anuar y= 2009,1 caused to be served, via United

States First-Class Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE TO
SUBMIT FOR DECISION to:
Steven W. Dougherty
Samantha J. Slark
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, 7th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Defendant Deseret Sky Development, LLU
Douglas L. Stowell
Adam L. Crayk
STOWELL LAW, PLLC
525 South 300 East. Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant Brighton Title Company, LtC
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ADAM C P ^ K
DOUGLAS L STOWELL
STOVvELL & CPAYK LAW, L LLC
525 S 300 L STE 20C
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84 111
RE

Coper Enterprises v

Deseret Sky

Appellate Case No

2009CL09

Dear Counsel
D

lease be dQvised that the Notice 01 Appeal m this case was
filed m the Utah Court of Appeals
Pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and
7
8^-4-103, Utah Cooe ^rpo^cleo, t^e cppea. nas oee^ transferred
to the Utah Supreme Co^rt oecause it is taren from an older or
judgment of a court ±r a case that is not within the original
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals
Tne case number is
20090209 end shoula be indicated on iutjre i m n u b d~d
correspondence
Included with this notice is an order transferring the case to
the Utah Court of Appeals within twenty days
The order remains
m effect, unless, within 10 calendar days of the date of the
order letters are received advising the Supreme Court why they
should retain the case
Rule 11(e) (1) of the Utah Rales of Appellate Procedure requires
that, within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal,
appellant must submit a transcript request for such parts of the
proceedings as the appellant deems necessary The transcript
request should be directed to the court executive in the tr_al
court A copy of tne request should also be mailed to the clerk
of the appellate cour4" to which tne appeal is taken
If no tianscripts 01 the proceedmas are to be reouested,
apoellart must rile a certificate to t^at erfect witft the clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATEi >F UTAH

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

ooOoc
Cooper E n t e r p r i s e s ,

P.C.,

Plaintiff

MAR ! I 2009

and A p p e l l e e ,

v.

Case No.

mm KsiiiQT ciiif

D e s e r e t Sky Development, LLC;
B r i g h t o n T i t l e Company, LLC;
and Does 1-10,
Defendants

20090209-SC

Third JudioiE! District

and A p p e l l a n t

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

m.

Deoutv Clerk

ORDER

Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and
effective twenty days from the date of this order, this matter will be
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. Thereafter,
all further pleadings and correspondence should ;be directed to that
Court. Prior to the effective date of the transfer, this Court is
willing to consider retaining this matter on its own docket.
Accordingly, any party to the appeal may submit a letter to the Court
regarding the appropriateness of retention. The letter shall contain
the following four categories of information, preceded by a heading
describing each category:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The name of the case and the appellate case number
The names of all parties involved in the case and the
attorneys and firms representing the parties.
A concise statement of the issues presented on appeal
A brief explanation of the reasons supporting retention or
transfer.

The letter shall not exceed
five pages and must ^ c received within ten
calendar days of the date of this order. In the event the tenth day
falls on a weekend or holiday, the letter must be received by the
first business day thereafter. Following transfer to the Court of
Appeals, the parties may not move for recall of the transfer.

Date

'

Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

